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FRIENDSHIP & THE LAW
Ethan J. Leib
This Article's central argument is that the law needs to do a better job of
recognizing, protecting, respecting, and promoting friendships. The law gives pride of
place to other statuses-family and special professional relationships are obvious
ones--but the status of the friend is rarely relevant to legal decisionmaking and public
policymaking in a consistent way. After defining the concept of the friend, I offer a
normative argument for why the law should promote a public policy of friendship
facilitation and for why the law ignores friendships only at its peril. I highlight how
the law already finds friendship relevant in certain issue areas without any self-
conscious or systematic understanding of it, and I recommend other issue areas
where friendship could matter more to legislators, courts, and legal scholars. We are
regulating friendships without even recognizing that we are doing so, and friendship
commands more attention from legal scholars and legal decisionmakers. I offer a
framework to show how the law could exact certain duties from friends and confer
certain privileges upon them as well.
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INTRODUCTION
The lawyer may have to utter with Montaigne (himself once a lawmaker),
"O my friends, there is no friend."' To be sure, there are lawyers who advocate
for their clients as friends.2 There are those who sue as "next friends" on behalf
of incompetents with whom there is no real or current friendship.3 And lawyers
sometimes submit amicus briefs, as "friends" of the court.4 Countries even enter
"friendship" treaties with one another.5 Yet, the status of the friend-the true
friend that is not merely a friend by analogy-seems nearly absent from the
law. We build within our legal system all sorts of preferences for family
members-for example, the recognition of marriage in our tax law, spousal
1. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Friendship, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 140
(Donald M. Frame trans., 1958). This aphorism is attributed to Aristotle and is the source of a long
set of reflections by Jacques Derrida. See JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP (George Collins
trans., Verso 1997) (1994); Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 85 J. PHIL. 632 (Gabriel Motzkin
trans., 1988). My own take on Aristotle and Montaigne's theories of friendship can be found in Ethan J.
Leib, The Politics of Family and Friends in Aristotle and Montaigne, 31 INTERPRETATION 165 (2004).
2. See Charles Fried, The Lauyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). But Fried acknowledges that "the ordinary concept of friendship provides
only an analogy." Id. at 1071. For thoughtful discussions of Fried's thesis, see DANIEL MARKOVITS,
TRAGIC VILLAINS ch. 3 (forthcoming 2007); Stephen R. Morris, The Lawyer as Friend: An Aristotelian
Inquiry, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 55 (2002).
3. 'Next friend' status is a jurisdictional grant of standing to a third party. The third party is
allowed to pursue the legal rights of the real party-in-interest. The grant of next friend status historically
has been limited to cases where, because of incapacity, incompetence or unavailability, the real party
in interest is unable to advocate his or her position." Paul F. Brown, Third Party Standing-"Next
Friends" as Enemies: Third Party Petitions for Capital Defendants Wishing To Waive Appeal: Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990), 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 981, 981 n.3 (1991). 1 discuss
more about next friend standing infra Part III.B.4.
4. See David Gossett, Friendship: Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 363 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Morocco, Jan. 1787, 8 Stat. 100.
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testimonial privileges and immunities, and whole areas of criminal law that
privilege family members 6-but we appear not to furnish the status of friend
with any clear legal recognition of consequence.' Other relationships of trust
and confidence are recognized by the law both through our regulation of
intimate relationships (e.g., husband-wife, parent-child, and nonmarital cohabit-
ers) and our protection of special professional relationships (e.g., lawyer-client,
doctor-patient, priest-parishioner, trustees, and fiduciaries).' But friends seem
left to fend for themselves without any possibility for recourse from a legal
system that recognizes their special roles in our lives.
This Article pursues the normative question of why we might wish for our
legal system to recognize friendship in a substantial way-and then mines the
law for places where friendship and the status of friend might usefully guide
legal decisionmaking. Perhaps surprisingly, there are domains within our law
where friendship has become relevant. But it has become so without any real
theory of how and why it should be so relevant and without any organized,
systematic, or consistent approach to relationships of friendship. This Article
argues that we would benefit from a legal system that recognizes the status of
friend; at the very least, scholars, lawmakers, and judges must become more
aware of how the law infringes upon, sustains, and regulates friendships.
Many areas of social inquiry outside the law have struggled to make sense
of friendship's place in our lives and its role in the structure of our governing
institutions. Philosophy,' psychology,'" political theory," literary studies,
2
6. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Problem of
Family Ties, 2007 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2007).
7. See Sanford Levmson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631,
654-56 (arguing that people should be able to choose to give a limited number of testimonial "privilege
tickets" to whomever they want, deciding for themselves where they most need a relationship of trust).
8. For an exploration of these relationships and how they are regulated, see Jill Elaine Hasday,
Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005).
9. In the next few footnotes, I provide wide-ranging bibliographies of the friendship literature in
various disciplines. I collect many sources in these early footnotes for ease of reference throughout the
Article. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM AND MORALITY (1980); TROY A.
JOLLIMORE, FRIENDSHIP AND AGENT-RELATIVE MORALITY (2001); THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP
IN MODERNITY (Preston King & Heather Devere eds., 2000); David B. Annis, The Meaning, Value,
and Duties of Friendship, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 351 (1987); Neera Kapur Badhwar, Friends as Ends in
Themselves, 48 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1987); Marcia Baron, Impartiality and Friendship,
101 ETHICS 836 (1991); Dean Cocking & Justin Oakley, Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the
Problem of Alienation, 106 ETHICS 86 (1995); Neera BadhwAr Kapur, Why It Is Wrong to Be Aluys Guided
by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship, 101 ETHICS 483 (1991); Simon Keller, Friendship and
Belief, 33 PHIL. PAPERS 329 (2004); Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, On Civic Friendship, 107 ETHICS 97 (1996);
Sarah Stroud, Epistemic Partiality in Friendship, 116 ETHICS 498 (2006); Jennifer E. Whiting, Impersonal
Friends, 74 MONIST 3 (1991); William H. Wilcox, Egoists, Consequentialists, and Their Friends, 16 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 73 (1987). Much of this literature considers whether, in light of morality's requirements of
equality, impartiality, and fair treatment to all, we may favor or exhibit bias toward our friends. For
more on this issue in particular, see infra Part ll.B.4.
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anthropology, 3 religious studies, 4 sociology," intellectual history (especially,
Another body of philosophical literature focuses on understanding Plato and Aristotle's early
efforts to develop theories of friendship-and the Roman appropriation of those theories. See,
e.g., DAVID BOLOTIN, PLATO'S DIALOGUE ON FRIENDSHIP: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE Lysis,
WITH A NEW TRANSLATION (1979); JEAN-CLAUDE FRAISSE, PHILIA: LA NOTION D'AMITIt
DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE ANTIQUE (1974); HORST HUTTER, POLITICS AS FRIENDSHIP: THE
ORIGINS OF CLASSICAL NOTIONS OF POLITICS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FRIENDSHIP
(1978); LORRAINE SMITH PANGLE, ARISTOTLE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIENDSHIP (2003);
PAUL SCHOLLMEIER, OTHER SELVES: ARISTOTLE ON PERSONAL AND POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP(1994); SUZANNE STERN-GILLET, ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF FRIENDSHIP (1995); John M.
Cooper, Aristotle on Friendship, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 301 (Am6lie Oksenberg Rorty
ed., 1980); Anthony Kronman, Aristotle's Idea of Political Fraternity, 24 AM. J. JURIS. 114 (1979).
10. See, e.g., CONVERSATIONS OF FRIENDS: SPECULATIONS ON AFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT
(John M. Gottman & Jeffrey G. Parker eds., 1986); BEVERLEY FEHR, FRIENDSHIP PROCESSES(1996); WILLIAM K. RAWLINS, FRIENDSHIP MATTERS: COMMUNICATION, DIALECTICS, AND
THE LIFE COURSE (1992); LILLIAN B. RUBIN, JUST FRIENDS: THE ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP IN OUR
LIVES (1985); THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: FRIENDSHIP IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE
(William M. Bukowski et al. eds., 1996); THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S FRIENDSHIPS (Steven R.
Asher & John M. Gottman eds., 1981).
11. See, e.g., HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL
COMMUNITY (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2005); DERRIDA, supra note 1; LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP: RETHINKING
POLITICS AND AFFECTION IN MODERN TIMES (Eduardo Velosquez ed., 2003); JAMES R. MARTEL, LOVE
IS A SWEET CHAIN: DESIRE, AUTONOMY, AND FRIENDSHIP IN LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY (2001);
CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996)(1932); Leib, supra note 1; James V. Schall, Friendship and Political Philosophy, 50 REV. METAPHYSICS
121 (1996); Jason A. Scorza, Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship, 32 POL. THEORY 85 (2004).
12. See ALLAN BLOOM, LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP (1993); CALEB CRAIN, AMERICAN
SYMPATHY: MEN, FRIENDSHIP, AND LITERATURE IN THE NEW NATION (2001); ANDREW
EPSTEIN, BEAUTIFUL ENEMIES: FRIENDSHIP AND POSTWAR AMERICAN POETRY (2006); RONALD
A. SHARP, FRIENDSHIP AND LITERATURE: SPIRIT AND FORM (1986); Wayne C. Booth, "The Way
I Loved George Eliot": Friendship with Books as a Neglected Critical Metaphor, KENYON REV., Spring
1980, at 4. For novels with especial insight into friendship, see TIM LOTT, WHITE CITY BLUE (1999),
and, perhaps, E. M. FORSTER, A PASSAGE TO INDIA (1924). For a fabulous collection of writers
on friendship from within the literary tradition, see THE NORTON BOOK OF FRIENDSHIP (Eudora
Welty & Ronald A. Sharp eds., 1991).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT BRAIN, FRIENDS AND LOVERS (1976); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE
FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 1990).
14. Scholars have undertaken different approaches to the subject of friendship and religion. See,
e.g., ALAN BRAY, THE FRIEND (2003) (a history of the church's relationship to friendship); C.S.
LEWIS, THE FOUR LOVES (1960) (a typological approach, highlighting different forms of love, including
the love of God); GILBERT MEILAENDER, FRIENDSHIP: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (1981)
(an ethical approach); GENE OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS (1972) (same).
15. See, e.g., LIZ SPENCER & RAY PAHL, RETHINKING FRIENDSHIP: HIDDEN SOLIDARITIES
TODAY (2006); GRAHAM A. ALLAN, A SOCIOLOGY OF FRIENDSHIP AND KINSHIP (1979) [hereinafter
ALLAN, A SOCIOLOGY]; GRAHAM ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPING A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
(1989) [hereinafter ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP]; GRAHAM ALLAN, KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP IN MODERN
BRITAIN (1996) [hereinafter ALLAN, KINSHIP]; CLAUDE S. FISCHER, TO DWELL AMONG FRIENDS:
PERSONAL NETWORKS IN TOWN AND CITY (1982); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF INTIMACY: SEXUALITY, LOVE AND EROTICISM IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1992); RAY PAHL, ON
FRIENDSHIP (2000); PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT (Rebecca G. Adams & Graham Allan eds.,
1998); Allan Silver, Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Modern
Sociology, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1474 (1990).
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the history of intellectuals)," and the self-help genre, 7 all, with their various
methods and tools, try to understand friendship. But the law and legal scholar-
ship are relatively silent about this social relationship. Admittedly, there are
occasional ruminations on the law and its failure to recognize the friend." Still,
the law has yet to develop a sophisticated approach to friendship-and this Arti-
cle aims to begin a conversation about why we should, how we might, and how
we do already recognize the status of friendship within the law. This Article ini-
tially focuses on getting the research agenda underway, defining and defending
the area of inquiry, and commencing the work of showing how friendship can be
and is already relevant to the law. But future work will develop more of the doc-
trinal specifics.
It is hard in this age to think about legal obligations and liabilities as being
based on a "status." Indeed, it is widely accepted that our legal culture-with all
16. See, e.g., A LATE FRIENDSHIP: THE LETTERS OF KARL BARTH AND CARL ZUCKMAYER
(Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., William B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1982) (1977); RONALD ARONSON,
CAMUS AND SARTRE: THE STORY OF A FRIENDSHIP AND THE QUARREL THAT ENDED IT (2004);
MICHAEL P. FARRELL, COLLABORATIVE CIRCLES: FRIENDSHIP DYNAMICS AND CREATIVE WORK
(2001); cf. BETWEEN FRIENDS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HANNAH ARENDT AND MARY MCCARTHY
1949-1975 (Carol Brightnan ed., 1995); BRAY, supra note 14; CRAIN, supra note 12.
A parallel genre may inelegantly be referred to as "neocon autobiographical intellectual history."
See JOSEPH EPSTEIN, FRIENDSHIP: AN EXPOSE (2006); NORMAN PODHORETZ, Ex-FRIENDS: FALLING
OUT WITH ALLEN GINSBERG, LIONEL & DIANA TRILLING, LILLIAN HELLMAN, HANNAH ARENDT,
AND NORMAN MAILER (1999). Or, perhaps, we might just call this latter genre memoir (often
written by neocons); certainly that is the most apt categorization of ANDREW SULLIVAN, LOVE
UNDETECTABLE: NOTES ON FRIENDSHIP, SEX, AND SURVIVAL (1998), a book with uncommon insight
on the subject of friendship generally. Why are neocons especially attracted to this subject? Sullivan
suggests that conservatives are committed to a "politics of philia," whereas "liberals" "are suspicious of
particular loyalties and seek to embrace universal values and egalitarian Politics." Id. at 244. That said,
Epstein's book hardly seems "political" in the conventional sense.
17. See, e.g., DALE CARNEGIE, HOW TO WIN FRIENDS & INFLUENCE PEOPLE (1936).
18. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman, The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature, 60 FORDHAM
L. REV. 645 (1992). Peter Goodrich's work takes the relationship between friendship and the law to
the center of his intellectual agenda. See Peter Goodrich, A Fragment on Cnutism with Brief
Divagations on the Philosophy of the Near Miss, 31 J.L. & SOC'Y 131 (2004); Peter Goodrich, Amatory
Jurisprudence and the Querelle des Lois, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 (2000); Peter Goodrich, Friends
in High Places: Amity and Agreement in Alsatia, 1 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT 41 (2005) [hereinafter Goodrich,
Friends in High Places]; Peter Goodrich, Laws of Friendship, 15 LAW & LITERATURE 23 (2003); Peter
Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 199 (2004) [hereinafter Goodrich, The
Immense Rumor]; Peter Goodrich, Un Cygne Noir, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 529 (2005). Goodrich,
however, is an outlier, whose extreme erudition and unconventional writing style (like Kaufman's)
likely keep many from recognizing the significance of the little work on friendship and the law
that exists. Moreover, neither Goodrich nor Kaufman carefully examines the existing doctrine
that does, in fact, regulate friendship; I treat this subject infra Part III. Finally, as I argue here,
Goodrich's ultimate definition of the friend is too capacious to command widespread recognition
for the law. In particular, he is too ready to put lovers and spouses in the category of friend, a
mistake that is counterproductive to getting the law to recognize the status of friend. I make this
argument infra Part I.A.
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progressive societies-has moved away from status toward "contract."'9  This
status-to-contract story maintains that the law once held us liable for our social
and familial roles but now holds us liable only for social relations to which we
consent voluntarily: Under a contract model, we are able to define our own roles
more freely and can limit our liabilities successfully by simply withholding our
consent from creating binding legal relations in our private social lives.2"
Yet it would be hard for us to insist that our legal system is a fully "volun-
tarist" one that ignores social roles": We hold mothers, fathers, spouses, children,
lawyers, common carriers, and monopolists to have special duties. There is room
for the status of the friend to gain more explicit, sophisticated, and systematic
legal treatment; and this Article aims to show where we have room for it in our
law, and where the law already enables the category of the friend to make a dif-
ference.22 But without a self-conscious analysis of who the friend is and why
friends are significant, the law's relatively random regulation of friendship
remains unsatisfying. We barely realize we are doing it, so how could we be doing
it thoughtfully?
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I aims to define the category of
friend relevant to this inquiry. It offers a narrow definition of the friend-one
that excludes family members, romantic partners, spouses, and a generalized
"civic friendship." Although this circumscription of the friendship relation may
be contentious, I believe it is necessary for reasons I later explain. The project of
Part I is mostly descriptive, but it is also meant to serve as the basis for a norma-
tive conception of friendship that the law could use, as the status of the friend
gains more explicit relevance in legal decisionmaking and public policymaking.
19. See SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 170 (Oxford Univ. Press 1959) (1861)
("[mlhe movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.").
20. For a case where a court has refused to find a promisor liable on account of a purported
failure of the promisor to intend to create legal relations, see Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 Eng. Rep. 571
(K.B.). Still, Balfour involved a contract between spouses, and one could just as easily argue that
this legal rule is a product of a status-based legal regime, even if the language of contract is used as
a subterfuge to avoid liabilities between spouses. For more on Balfour, see Stephen Hedley, Keeping
Contract in Its Place-Balfour v. Balfour and the Enforceability of Informal Agreements, 5 OXFORDJ. LEGAL
STUD. 391 (1985). For an argument that our family law is still too oriented by contract, and that
it should be returned to its status-oriented roots, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND
THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993).
21. For a discussion on "voluntarism" more generally, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Families,
Nations, and Strangers (1995), reprinted in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 48 (2001).
22. Although traditionally the concept of "status" allows for legal liabilities and perquisites
to attach as a matter of law without elaborate fact-finding (at least in the fiduciary duty context,
for example), it undoubtedly remains the case that status-based legal conclusions still require that
certain evidentiary thresholds be met. Accordingly, the obvious fact-based nature of any finding
of friendship should not preclude our thinking about the friend as a potential status.
636 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 631 (2007)
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Part II makes the normative case for the friend's relevance to the law. It
first makes an affirmative argument, highlighting the benefits that could
accrue from the state's support of friendship. Then it addresses some powerful
objections. For example, some might argue that private consensual relation-
ships like friendships flourish and retain intrinsic value precisely because the
law cannot touch them; much of friendship's value may come from its being a
fully consensual and voluntary relation outside the law. Thus, friendship, rather
than being enhanced through legal recognition and regulation, might be debased
if it failed to remain autonomous from the public legal sphere.
Or one might argue that friendships accentuate gender, racial, or class-based
cleavages in society. The law's recognition of friendship could risk further
entrenching the balkanizing and homogenizing forces of friendship, which tend
to divide groups and do not contribute to broad social integration.
Third, friendship has traditionally maintained a subversive posture with
respect to the state. Friends are routinely aligned against the state precisely
because the duties of friendship are often seen as more important than the
commands of nationalism or patriotism. And sometimes friendship is seen as
underwriting partiality when morality requires more general impartiality. If these
subversive visions of friendship are right, the state would seem to help friends
only to its disadvantage.
Finally, one might argue that the law's regulation of social relations in the
private sphere can only be reactive. Accordingly, a legal or judicial recognition
of friendship might only end up addressing friendships that have failed. Part 11
develops these counterarguments and seeks to explain why they are not, in the
final analysis, persuasive objections to the project of getting the law to appreciate
the status of the friend.
Part III highlights areas within the law where friendship has been or could
be relevant, even if scholars and judges have thus far ignored a systematic
approach to the subject. In particular, Part III considers the status of friendship as
it pertains to certain potential legal obligations and legal privileges: the duties of
rescue, disclosure, fair dealing, and confidentiality; and the privileges of
informality, caregiving, privacy, and the vindication of rights. This investigation
spans a broad array of legal doctrines from fraud to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, testimonial privileges to testamentary dispositions, securities
regulation to donative promises, and the law of fiduciary duties to the
entrapment defense. This survey is poised to show how often the friend turns out
to be relevant for the law, how much more the law could do to promote
friendship, and how much the law could benefit from greater clarity and
consistency in its treatment of the friend.
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This Article contends that it would be a dramatic step of progress for our
law to recognize friendship explicitly and consistently, giving a most important
social resource in all of our lives the respect of legal relevance, along with the
benefits that can accrue from legal promotion and facilitation. Showing respect
for a relationship does not, of course, mean that the law needs to do everything
it can to promote it. However, it does important relationships no great service
by ignoring them for the most part and by having no systematic approach to
knowing when, how, and why they matter." Friendships are central to our
ability to flourish-and lawyers, judges, and legislators need to develop more
sophisticated thinking about the intersections of friendship and the law. This
Article is a step in that direction.
I. WHO IS A FRIEND?
The category of "friend" is a hard one to define-and this definitional
challenge may be the biggest impediment to the entire research enterprise
commenced here. The vast majority of us know who our parents, children,
brothers, and sisters are." But figuring out who constitutes a friend-and when
friendship starts and ends--may be a harder task. A casual definition is usually
ready to hand, but it is more challenging to settle on a working definition for
more careful analysis.25 Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that 'friend is
not just a categorical label ... indicating the social position of each individual
relative to the other. Rather it is a relational term which signifies something
about the quality and character of the relationship involved."26
Indeed, if you asked everyone in the country to list his or her friends, it
would be reasonable to suspect that those lists would not always line up: Some
people would list friends who would not reciprocate. Even friends who would list
one another in this thought experiment perhaps cannot be relied upon to be
"true" friends at the core, for we all likely operate with varying thresholds,
tolerances, and expectations for friendship. We sometimes feel social pressure to
call someone a friend. Yet, perhaps, if pressed we all know who our "real" friends
are. We think we know when we have reliable ones, but that does not give
satisfactory guidance for any form of codification or sustained thinking.
23. See Hasday, supra note 8, at 528-30 (arguing that we can furnish respect for certain
intimate relationships through various means and need not pursue all strategies at once).
24. Even defining the family, however, presents all kinds of serious challenges; non-kin ties
can sometimes come within the concept of the family. See SPENCER & PAHL, supra note 15, at 36.
25. See FEHR, supra note 10, at 5 ("Everyone knows what friendship is-until asked to
define it. Then, it seems, no one knows.").
26. ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 16.
638 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 631 (2007)
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This is an inauspicious beginning. As my first gambit, I will have to
define the sort of friendship central to this inquiry. I start by suggesting what
it must not be and follow with some general observations about how to pick
friends out of the world of interpersonal relationships. The effort here is empiri-
cal, conceptual, and theoretical insofar as it is based on studies of the social
phenomenon from a multitude of different disciplinary approaches and on a
long tradition of thinking about friendship. But it is also normative, insofar
as this descriptive project should be an excellent starting point for a
definition the law could draw upon should the status of the friend command
more organized treatment within the law. To be sure, it may be that differen-
tial normative considerations presented by varying areas of law would counsel
for us to work with a differentiated conception of friendship, depending on
the area of law affected.2 ' But we nevertheless need a starting point to guide
the discussion.
A. Friendship Is Not Kinship
Friendship is not kinship, and if a relationship is one of kinship, it can-
not also be classified as a friendship." Friends may not be related by blood or
marriage, and they may not engage in any ongoing sexual relationship.
Although there is something crude and contrived in this narrow version of
the friend relation, it is necessary in performing a proper analysis of the cate-
gory, and necessary if the law is ever to recognize the status of friend. To be
sure, friendship will often be a love relation, 9 and certainly spouses and lovers
routinely think of themselves as friends (even best of friends))0 And friends
who are not in fact lovers may still pine for one another sexually, whether
27. We undoubtedly work with varied conceptions of the family across issue areas within the
law-sometimes only the nuclear family is relevant, sometimes the extended family is-but we just as
surely can speak generally of special duties and privileges that attach to the family within the law.
28. In other work, I have argued for a more capacious working definition of friendship, one that
includes familial relations-what Aristotle called the "friendship of unequals"-within its boundaries.
See Leib, supra note 1. But in that work, I was exploring the use of friendship in political theory. Here, I
have different, more practical and legal, aims; the concept to be isolated must be more narrowly defined
for reasons I explain in the text.
29. FEHR, supra note 10, at 4 ("[Wlhen lay people are asked to list types of love, friendship is listed
most fr quently. Friendship love also is seen as capturing the meaning of love .... ") (citations omitted).
30. As Ray Pahl argues, "There may now be some normative pressure to put one's partner into
the category of'best friend'." PAHL, supra note 15, at 36. Even among those who succumb to this social
pressure, there is often resort to a "real" best friend to vent about or discuss the primary erotic
relationship. See id. at 38-39.
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consciously or subconsciously.' Nevertheless, here, I must insist on an "exclu-
sive" definition of the friend.32
This is not a mere purist's instinct.33 If spouses, lovers, and family mem-
bers could claim the status of friend, three problems might emerge. First, con-
ceptual confusion might result because it could become much more difficult to
isolate the work friendship does in our private lives and in the structure of our
social and political lives. If the category of friend was so capacious as to include
all our love-based and sexual relations-or even just those that are also
"friendly" as well-it could become extremely difficult to ascertain or promote
friendship's role in society. We couldn't know as clearly what work friendship
was doing by itself and what work kinship and romantic or erotic relationships
were doing through their particular forms of love. Romantic love, familial
love, and sex might confound an analysis of friendship proper.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, by failing to disentangle friendship
from sexual and familial intimacy, our public policy concerns about friendship
might be subordinated to our public policy concerns in regulating other forms
of intimacy, centrally the family.34 It is not that I want to condone here the
31. See, e.g., BRAIN, supra note 13, at 222 ("Freudians maintain that amity derives from
sexual instincts."). The theme of same-sex friendship as a form of homoeroticism is omnipresent in
discussions of friendship. See id. at 264; LEWIS, supra note 14, at 72 ("It has actually become necessary
in our time to rebut the theory that every firm and serious friendship is really homosexual.");
PAHL, supra note 15, at 28-29. For an interesting argument that gay friendship is an especially
useful model of friendship in modem times because gays have developed a deep "culture of friendship"
(in large measure for their suffering through AIDS together and for their exclusion from legal
recognition), see SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 175-76, 230-35.
32. It may be worth noting that there are some who argue that once people marry and begin to
form their own families, friendships are prevented from forming and the intimacy of marriage shuts out a
role for friendship. See, e.g., Rebecca G. Adams & Graham Allan, Contextualising Friendship, in
PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 15, at 1, 8 (arguing that kin relationships prevent
friendships from forming). But see Stacey J. Oliker, The Modernisation of Friendship: Individualism,
Intimacy, and Gender in the Nineteenth Century, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 15,
at 18, 27 (arguing that intimate friendship itself developed with the growth of intimate marriages).
Others, drawing upon Aristotle, see familial friendship as begetting more complete and truer
friendships. See, e.g., Elizabeth Belfiore, Family Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics, 21 ANCIENT PHIL. 113,
113-18, 126-31 (2001).
33. Indeed, this move should be reminiscent of one of Socrates's most important suggestions
in the Lysis, Plato's dialogue on friendship. Socrates insists on the strong separation between the loves
of kinship, which are unchosen, and the love of friendship, which is considered wholly voluntary. See
BOLOTIN, supra note 9, at 65-66 (highlighting that one of the main themes of the dialogue is the
"releasing," or lysis, of family bonds); EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at xiii ("[Wihere there is sex, there is not
friendship ...."). Of course, this is generally an oversimplification. But there is a need for this
oversimplification--one I explain in the text.
34. For one legal scholar's effort to run together family and friends, and see them as of a
piece, see Goodrich, Friends in High Places, supra note 18. Goodrich ultimately sets himself up for
disappointment in locating a jurisprudence of friendship in the regulation of family because he too easily
assimilates the family as a form of friendship. Eliding the distinction between family and friends has
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way intimacy, marriage, and the family are regulated in our society. Rather, we
must acknowledge such regulation and distinguish other forms of intimacy.
Indeed, precisely because we regulate sex, marriage, and family so substantially,
friendship could get lost in the regulation if we operate with a working definition
of friendship that includes sex or family. By keeping the category of friend
separate and mutually exclusive from the status of spouse, family, or lover, our
approach to friendship remains more sensitive to the different-and potentially
more appropriate-public policy concerns relevant to friendship in particular.
If we seek to have a general law of amity that includes all forms of intimacy, our
too-obsessive approach to the regulation of the family will bleed into and crowd
out a proper appreciation of friendship on its own terms.
Third, kinship relationships are routinely friendships of unequals Par-
ents are not our social equals; neither are our uncles or older sisters.
Although spousal friendships might optimally be considered friendships of
equality, the structure of our society-and its gendered nature-perhaps rec-
ommend against facilely concluding that husbands and wives easily maintain
friendships free from distortions of power.
In the final analysis, it may also be "maligning friendship always to asso-
ciate it with sex, '' 6 and it may be that familial "love is essentially possessive
which is inimical to the pure form of friendship." 7
unwelcome consequences for an analysis of the law's relationship to friendship. And failing to
distinguish properly between family and friends may tend to focus the discussion about friendship and
alternative forms of intimacy on the same-sex marriage debate-a debate that might be usefully
informed by my account here but one that should not shape it, since much more is at play in that
debate than the regulation of friendship per se. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends
and for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2001)
(failing to maintain a distinction between sex-based unions and friendship proper); Richard Stith,
Keep Friendship Unregulated, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 263 (2004) (same).
From another perspective, there is a movement underway (outside the United States, for the most
part) to protect all intimacy without any consideration or special privileges for conjugal relationships.
See, e.g., Law C)mm'n of Can., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001) [hereinafter BEYOND CONJUGALITY], available at
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/3 /lcc-cdc/beyond -conjugality-e/pdf/37152-e.pdf; Nancy D. Polikoff,
Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2003); Brenda Cossiman & Bruce
Ryder, What Is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality, 18 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 269
(2001). Ultimately, if friends received the same treatment tinder the law as married couples, we
could get "beyond conjugality." But this radical agenda is not very likely to be adopted anytime
soon, and nonconjugal friendship is especially underprotected under current legal regimes,
justifying special attention to them here.
35. See, e.g., MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE FRIENDS FOR? 207 (1993) (contrasting the
equality of friendship with the unequal power relations in families).
36. BRAIN, supra note 13, at 65.
37. PAHL, supra note 15, at 88. 1 concede that many family law scholars may consider iimy
effort to treat friendly and familial intimacies differently as troublesome-both practically and
morally. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits? (Nov. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
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B. What Is Friendship?
The following set of criteria may be useful in delineating the contours of
the friendship relation. These characteristics are not exhaustive, mutually exclu-
sive, or necessary conditions for friendship; rather, they constitute an illustrative
composite sketch of attributes that friendships may instantiate, drawing upon a
wealth of analysis from disciplines outside the law." And if the law were ever
to develop a systematic approach to friendship and its privileges and obligations,
lawyers, judges, and legislators may wish to appeal to this set of characteristics
to help decide who should count as a friend in any given issue area.
Voluntariness. Friends voluntarily associate with one another with
regularity, voluntarily seek the company of one another, are voluntarily
interdependent, and voluntarily seek proximity to one another," all
without strong social pressures to do so. Of course, friendships ultimately
come with a set of very real ethical obligations,40 but the association in
the first instance is rarely an externally enforced one.4'
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/1 l_6_rosenbury-friends draft_2_.pdf. Yet, for the reasons
announced here, I hope my na'ivet6 can be indulged. At the very least, the attempt to classify
who counts as a friend gets more, rather than less, complex with the inclusion of our full range of
intimacies within the friend category. An argument that family and friends are best viewed as
nonmutually exclusive can be found in SPENCER & PAHL, supra note 15, at 108-27. Their
argument is from a sociological perspective, however, not a legal one.
38. This composite draws from, inter alia, ALLAN, A SOCIOLOGY, supra note 15, at 85, 89,
95, 99, 107; ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15; ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bks. viii-ix
(Terence Irwin trans., 1985); ELAINE DONELSON & JEANNE E. GULLAHORN, WOMEN: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 156-67 (1977); FEHR, supra note 10, at 6-8; LEWIS, supra note 14;
PAHL, supra note 15; RAWLINS, supra note 10; JOHN M. REISMAN, ANATOMY OF FRIENDSHIP 93-94
(1979); Keith E. Davis & Michael J. Todd, Assessing Friendship: Prototypes, Paradigm Cases and
Relationship Description, in UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH 17 (Steve Duck & Daniel Perlman eds., 1985); Willard W. Hartup, The Origins of
Friendship, in FRIENDSHIP AND PEER RELATIONS 11 (Michael Lewis & Leonard A. Rosenblum eds.,
1975); Robert B. Hays, Friendship, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND INTERVENTIONS 391,391-96 (Steve Duck ed., 1988); Paul H. Wright, Self-Referent
Motivation and the Intrinsic Quality of Friendship, 1 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 115, 119 (1984).
39. Online friendships, perhaps, call for their own analysis. See JEFFREY BOASE ET AL., THE
STRENGTH OF INTERNET TIES (2006); Rebecca G. Adams, The Demise of Territorial Detenminism: Online
Friendships, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 15, at 153. The work of Danah
Boyd, a self-described "ethnographer" of Friendster and other online communities is also worth
perusing. See Danah Boyd, Publications, Installations, Presentations & Workshop Papers,
http://www.danah.org/papers (last visited Dec. 28, 2006). For my purposes here, we can simply say
that an online friendship can qualify for friendship status if it meets the majority of the criteria
enumerated here.
40. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 69 ("Whatever else it has to do with, friendship entails
obligation-sometimes ample and demanding, sometimes miniscule and subtle, but always, I
believe, present.").
41. Scott Feld and William Carter call friendship the "most voluntary type of personal
relationship." Scott Feld & William C. Carter, Foci of Activity as Changing Contexts for Friendship, in
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Intimacy. Friends seek intimacy with one another through time spent
together developing their relationship.42 They pursue mutual knowledge
and discovery of one another through conversation and activities. There
is often something confessional about conversations with friends; or, at
44least, friends are those to whom we can more easily confess. In some
undeniable way, confession breeds intimacy.
Trust. Friends tend to be trusting of one another and develop trust
through private disclosures, sincerity, loyalty, openness of self, and
authenticity.45 "What do we tell our friends?" Andrew Sullivan asks. "We
tell them everything. And we are not afraid of embarrassing ourselves or
boring each other., 46 Yet perhaps this view is slightly inflated: According
to Graham Allan, "While there is a folk belief that total disclosure is the
sign of real friendship, in reality friends rarely know everything about
one another., 47 We often withhold matters from our friends not because
we do not trust them, but because we know they are not fundamentally
interested in all we could share.
Perhaps trust is better defined as follows: "Trust is a belief that another
will fulfill his or her obligations and pull his or her weight in [a] relation-
ship. Symbolic gestures and experience create and maintain trust. 4"
Solidarity and Exclusivity. Friends identify with one another and
consider one another aligned on some central dimensions.49 More,
PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 15, at 136, 136; see also Allan Silver, Friendship and
Trust as Moral Ideals: An Historical Approach, 30 EURO. J. SoC. 274 (1989) (arguing that friendships
are quintessentially voluntary).
42. Although time spent together is central, friendships clearly can endure some time spent
apart. See SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 204.
43. See id. ("[F]riendship draws strength from the past, from myriad shared jokes and
understandings, from the remembrance of moments endured or celebrated together, especially the
small ones."); Silver, supra note 15, at 1477 ("Friendship ... turns on intimacy-the confident
revelation of one's inner self to a trusted other .... ); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 40 ("[Olne
of the things one looks for in a friend ... is the possibility of easy candor in conversation.");
MONTAIGNE, supra note 1, at 136 ("Friendship feeds on communication.").
44. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 61; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 204 ("ITIhe
more you know a friend, the more a friend he is.").
45. See generally Allan Silver, Friendship and Sincerity, 2003 SOZIALERSINN 123. For more
on the "secrets" view of friendship, see generally Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship
and the Self, 108 ETHICS 502 (1998).
46. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 216.
47. ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 107.
48. 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 230 n.3 (2d ed. 2003).
49. One routinely sees this facet of friendship described as "agreement," "consensus," or
"concord." See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 6, ll. 1167a22-b15 (noting that
friends have similar judgments about their common interests); EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 60 (citing
Cicero's suggestion that friendship requires "agreement over all things divine and human");
Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note 18, at 211-12 (discussing concord and agreement as
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friends--even if not necessarily or essentially dyadic 5°-breed a sense of
exclusivity.5  As C.S. Lewis understood, to claim "[these are my friends"
importantly implies that "[tihose are not. 52 Friendship is "selective and
an affair of the few."
5 3
Reciprocity. Friends engage in mutual regard and make an effort to
reciprocate in the realms of caring, emotional support, and goodwill.54
Also, friends wish their counterparts well for their own sake, rather
than for any benefit that might accrue to a friend on account of the
other's well-being. Each party to a friendship self-consciously engages in
central to friendship). Some even use more legally familial expressions, describing friendships as
between those who have achieved a "meeting of the minds." See PAHL, supra note 15, at 42.
Friendship as concord plays a substantial role in theories of "civic friendship," a form of
friendship only peripheral to my concerns here. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 22 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759) (arguing that "concord,"
understood as friendship among citizens, is required for "the harmony of society"); see also
ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 6,11. 1167a22-b5.
The idea that friends are "soul mates" or "second selves" permeates the friendship literature. See,
e.g., id., at bk. ix, ch. 9,11. 1170b5-b8 ("A friend is another [ self'); MONTAIGNE, supra note 1, at 141,
143 (arguing that friends are of "one soul in two bodies" and maintain a "fusion of... wills"; friends
are a "second self'). Still, there is certainly an undercurrent in the literature of friendship that aims to
emphasize that in differentiated society, friends cannot fulfill all of our varied needs. See EPSTEIN,
supra note 16, at 54 (drawing upon Georg Simmel's conception of "differentiated friendships"). Hence,
agreement need only be reached on particular dimensions in any given case, "but only provided the
things they disagree about are not all that important to them." PODHORETZ, supra note 16, at 4.
50. Here is why perhaps friendship need not be deemed dyadic at its core:
[I1f, of three friends (A, B, and C), A should die, then B loses not only A but "A's part in
C," while C loses not only A but "A's part in B." In each of my friends there is something
that only some other friend can fully bring out. By myself I am not large enough to call the
whole man into activity; I want other lights than my own to show all his facets. Now that
Charles is dead, I shall never again see Ronald's reaction to a specifically Caroline joke. Far
from having more of Ronald, having him "to myself' now that Charles is away, I have less
of Ronald.... Two friends delight to be joined by a third, and three by a fourth, if only the
newcomer is qualified to become a real friend.
LEWIS, supra note 14, at 73-74. For other discussions of whether friendship is essentially dyadic, see
ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 10, 27; Stephen R. Marks, The Gendered Contexts of Inclusive
Intimacy: The Hawthorne Women at Work and Home, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra
note 15, at 43, 43-44. Here's Aristotle's take: "[T]he friendship of companions is not found in groups
of many people, and the friendships celebrated in song are always between two people." ARISTOTLE,
supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 10, 1. 1171a15. Perhaps "couple friendships"-the phenomenon of
married couples becoming friends-is a counterexample to the prevalence of dyads. In the final
analysis, however, little is at stake in this question for my current project.
51. See LEWIS, supra note 14, at 100 ("Indeed the [flriendship may be 'about' almost nothing
except the fact that it excludes."); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 2 ("By its nature, friendship is
preferential: one chooses one person over another to draw closer to; an element of exclusivity is
implied in the word 'friend."'); PAHL, supra note 15, at 164 (friendship is "fundamentally"
"exclusive"). C.S. Lewis also warns that friendship may breed pride in the friendship itself, a feature
that may help solidarity, but that has dangers of its own. See LEWIS, supra note 14, at 83-87.
52. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 72.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 22.
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reciprocity and is aware of her counterpart's goodwill. Unlike a romantic
interest, which can be unrequited, friendship must be shared with an
awareness of mutual regard.
Warmth. Friends feel warmly and tenderly toward one another
much of the time. This warmth and tenderness frequently manifests itself
as a form of acceptance, flaws notwithstanding. Friendship is as much an
emotion as it is an activity or art. And it inclines us to be forgiving, to
withhold blame for minor infractions, and to serve as a sounding board
in a nurturing environment.
Mutual Assistance. Friends help one another practically by offering
advice, comfort, networks and connections, material aid (in the form of
loans or gifts),56 and favors of various kinds. 7 Although most of these
forms of help will trigger reciprocity, it is useful to isolate the kinds of prac-
tical assistance with daily living that friendship involves. Indeed, focusing
upon reciprocity tends to occlude the more banal exchange relationship
embedded in most friendships. It is only idealism of a misguided formn to
presume that friendship is not instrumental in part."' After all, how could
reciprocity truly obtain if exchange were not part of the equation?
Although friendship is something more than a mere relationship of
exchange, some exchange must be part of the give and take of friendship)s9
55. See SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 236 ("Friendship is about acceptance.").
56. "In-kind" transfers or gifts help reinforce the solidarity of friendships and help symbolize to
parties that they are not mere commercial partners. See Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics
of Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 156 (1983); Janet T. Landa, The
Enigma of the Kula Ring: Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 137,
152-56 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS
567, 568 (1986). See generally MAUSS, supra note 13. Robert Ellickson uses these sources to devise an
illustrative example:
Dinner guests, for example, commonly bring their host a gift such as a bottle of wine. But no
dinner guest would, instead of bringing wine, arrive and say, "Here's twenty dollars. I've
learned in an Economics course that you'd undoubtedly prefer this to the usual bottle of wine."
The tender of cash would signal that the guest thought of the dinner not as ail occasion
among friends but as an occasion at a restaurant, where diners have a merely commercial
relationship with those who serve them.
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 235 (1991).
57. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 57 ("Only on relatively rare occasions do
friends provide one another with direct financial support. They may lend each other small amounts
to cover, say, the cost of a round of drinks or admission to some event if one of them is short of cash,
but on the whole do not enter into more significant loans with one another."). But friends routinely
furnish their counterparts with free child care, free places to stay (to avoid forcing their counterparts
to pay for a hotel), and can be useful sources of employment information. See id. at 57-58.
58. See id. at 20.
59. See Richard Lempert, Normn-Making in Social Exchange: A Contract Law Model, 7 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 1, 2 (1972) ("[AI number of quite prominent sociologists and social psychologists are prepared
to argue that almost all social interaction [including friendship] may profitably be viewed as exchange
transactions." (citing "exchange theory" classics PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL
LIFE (1964); GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961); George
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Nevertheless, there is probably a norm within friendship that prevents
parties from being too explicit about keeping tabs. 
6
Equality. As between friends, no feelings of superiority are appropriate,
and social prestige should be irrelevant.6' Although friends are rarely
equal in all ways, true friends treat one another as such. Friends give and
take equally, or risk rupturing the bond of friendship."
Duration Over Time. Friendships wax and wane, dissolve, intensify,
and become attenuated over time. Nevertheless, friendship must involve
some durability. As Joseph Epstein writes, "A relationship with an
acquaintance doesn't postulate a future."
63
Conflict and Modalities of Conflict Resolution. Friendships of substantial
duration undoubtedly enter phases of tension and conflict. 4 Yet most
C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. SoC. 597 (1958))). As Lempert recognizes, it would
defy "common sense" to see friendship as only exchange. Lempert, supra, at 2-3. But, all the same, there
is undeniably an element of exchange embedded in every friendship, and norms developed therein allow
for the parties to a friendship to draw upon the implicit exchange morality. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP,
supra note 15, at 22.
60. Robert Ellickson argues:
Fellow-feeling seems more likely to arise when [parties] are seen to act out of friendship, not
out of a need to scratch each other's backs. Close friends have such a long future ahead of
them that they need not worry about minor imbalances in the reciprocated favors between
them. Therefore, a person who mentions that accounts have fallen a bit out of balance
indicates either a lack of intimacy or some skepticism about future solidarity.
ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 236.
61. See, e.g., ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 108 ("The essence of friendship from a
sociological perspective is that it is a tie of equality."); ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 89
("Friendship, in whatever form it takes, is defined as a relationship between equals. That is, within
friendship there is little sense of social hierarchy or status difference."); BRAIN, supra note 13, at 20
("Equality... is part and parcel of friendship."); PAHL, supra note 15, at 164, 167 (Friendship is
"egalitarian" and "has no place in hierarchies or authoritarian structures."); Graham Allan, Friendship
and the Private Sphere, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 15, at 71, 76; Pat O'Connor,
Women's Friendships in a Post-Modern World, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 15, at
117, 127.
62. See ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 89-90. However, Epstein argues:
Francis Bacon, on this point, claims that "there is little friendship in the world, and least of
all that between equals." I take Bacon's point to be that equality between people is chiefly
a spur to rivalry, which can be death on friendship. And Balzac, with that worldly cynicism
one comes to expect (and enjoy) in him, backs up Bacon by remarking that "nothing so
fortifies a friendship as the belief on the part of one friend that he is superior to the other."
EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 8.
63. Id. at 2. It may even be that no regular contact is required if a friendship forms in
particularly intense ways or at a particularly formative time. See SPENCER & PAHL, supra note 15,
at 50 (reporting case of a man who considered his closest friend to be a "childhood companion
and co-evacuee during World War II to whom he had not spoken in over twenty years").
64. See BERNARD YACK, THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL ANIMAL: COMMUNITY, JUSTICE,
AND CONFLICT IN ARISTOTELIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 110 (1993) (contending that, for Aristotle,
friendship is "a source of conflict as well as a means of promoting greater cooperation"). Some
even idealize conflict in friendship. See MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of the Art of Discussion, in
MONTAIGNE, supra note 1, at 705 ("[Friendship] delights in the sharpness and vigor [of verbal]
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friendships have resources to mediate conflict that are achieved through
maintenance and effort.6 ' Friends must be willing to manage conflict
66because they are invested in the relational enterprise and its future.
To be sure, listing a bunch of attributes, some of which obtain in a given
friendship and some of which do not, is a clinical method of getting at an
important social relation that contributes to our integrity and our dignity.
There are, of course, more romantic depictions of friendship in our cultural
heritage, and they undoubtedly shed some truth on the relation at issue better
than a top-ten list. Still, this composite sketch of the friend delineates the
concept rather well and, in turn, could be the basis of the law's identification
of the friendship relation.
C. Aristotle on Friendship
It seems necessary in modem discussions of friendship to compare one's
account with Aristotle's canonical treatment of friendship in books eight and
nine of his Nicomachean Ethics.67 Although he was not the first to get his
thoughts about the matter into a printed form that makes its way to our
generation-that distinction might belong to Socrates, as chronicled by
Plato in the Lysis6s and the Symposium 69-- our modem conception of friendship
intercourse .... It is not vigorous and generous enough if it is not quarrelsome, if it is civilized and
artful, if it fears knocks and moves with constraint.").
65. See PAHL, supra note 15, at 86 (claiming that friendship requires time and effort);
SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 204 (claiming that friendship "needs tending").
66. See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 240 ("[Friendship] calls for regular maintenance through
thoughtful cultivation."); id. at 241 ("The very word friendship.., implies not passivity but an
active hand; it suggests taking control, charting a course, planning a future.").
67. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 11, I. 11 55al to bk. ix, ch. 11, 1. 11 72 a2O.
There is also much to be learned from Aristotle's slightly different discussion of friendship in his
Eudemian Ethics. See A.W. PRICE, LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 121 (1989)
(arguing that the Eudemian account is "more abstract and metaphysical," whereas the Nicomachean
is "more concrete and empirical"); Michael Pakaluk, Friendship and the Comparison of Goods, 37
PHRONESIS 111, 129 (1992) (suggesting that the Nicomachean account must be read in light of the
account of friendship in the Eudemian Ethics). Still, because the Nicomachean Ethics is the version
most often read and discussed, I focus my treatment here virtually exclusively on the theory
elaborated there.
Aristotle's Politics and Art of Rhetoric are other underappreciated sources of insight about
Aristotle's theory of friendship. See Leib, supra note 1, at 168, 175-77 (exploring the relevance of
Aristotle's Politics to his account of friendship); Kronman, supra note 9 (same); SULLIVAN, supra
note 16, at 191-92 (discussing Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric).
68. See BOLOTIN, supra note 9, at 17-52 (translating and commenting on the Lysis, Plato's
dialogue most directly about friendship).
69. See PLATO, Symposium, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 215 (William Chase Greene ed.,
Benjamin Jowett trans., 1927). Some might also include the Phaedrus. PLATO, Phaedrus, in id. at 435.
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owes much to an Aristotelian legacy that has traveled through Cicero,7"
Montaigne,7' Emerson,72 and others.73
Aristotle's inquiry into friendship begins by asking some very basic ques-
tions about the relationship: (1) if friends must be similar or if opposites
attract;74 (2) whether friends must be virtuous in order to maintain friend-
ships;7" and (3) whether happy people need friendship too, or whether the happy
are self-sufficient without friendship. 76 Aristotle concludes that friendship "is
most necessary for our life," and that "no one would choose to live without
friends even if he had all the other goods. 77
These preliminary inquiries help Aristotle separate true friendships
(sometimes called "character friendships" or "virtue friendships") from other
kinds. Indeed, Aristotle's main legacy to contemporary discussions about friend-
ship is his tripartite typology of friendship that isolates a pure or true form. For
Aristotle, there are three degrees or species of friendship: friendships that are
useful, friendships that are pleasant, and friendships of the good. 8
Friendships that are useful bring personal gain, and pleasant friendships
bring pleasure. 79  Although Aristotle insists that these species of friendships
deserve the title of friendship more than, say, the "natural friendships" we have
for animals, our children, and our fellow human beings,80 Aristotle considers the
useful and the pleasant forms of friendship incomplete because they are easily
70. See CICERO, DE SENECTUTE, DE AMICITIA, DE DIVINATIONE (William Armistead
Falconer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
71. See MONTAIGNE, supra note 1.
72. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Friendship (1841), in RALPH WALDO EMERSON: ESSAYS
AND LECTURES 339 (Library of America 1983).
73. Heather Devere traces the cultural heritage (suggesting that perhaps even Plato may be
a latecomer) in Heraclitus, Xenophon, Herodotus, Lucretius, Lysias, Plotinus, Epicurus, Euripedes,
Plutarch, Homer, Sappho, Ovid, Virgil, and Seneca. See Heather Devere, Reviving Greco-Roman
Friendship: A Bibliographical Review, in THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY, supra note 9, at
149. Goodrich also performs a nice genealogy, focusing on lawyers' contribution to the tradition in
particular. See Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note 18, at 206 (tracing ruminations on friendship
through lawyers Cicero, Alciatus, Elyot, Bacon, Montaigne, Fulbeck, Wither, and Brathwaite).
Goodrich believes that "it was lawyers who wrote about friendship because it is what they most lacked
and hence what they most desired." Id. at 228.
74. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 1, 11. 1155a32-b8.
75. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 1,11. 1155bl1-b16.
76. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 9, Ul. 1169b3-blO.
77. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 1,11. 1155a2-a6.
78. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 3,11. 1156a7-b33.
79. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 3, 11. 1156a10-a22.
80. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 1, 11. 1155a17-a23. The "lower" species of friendships are friendships,
Aristotle claims, only by "similarity" to the most complete friendships, not in "the primary way."
Id. at bk. viii, ch. 4, 11. 1157a26-a33. Good friends "are friends unconditionally; the others are friends
coincidentally and by being similar to these." Id. at bk. viii, ch. 4, 11. 1157bl-b5. "[F]riendship of
character," however, "is friendship itself." Id. at bk. viii, ch. 14,11. 1163b13-b14.
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dissolved. Both friendships are used as a means toward some intenrnediate end,
and friendships sought merely for pleasure are likely to disintegrate when the end
in question is achieved or when pleasure is achieved and then dissipates."'
Good friendships endure; 2 they are constituted by "good people similar in
virtue"" so need does not tarnish the friendship. Together, friends seek the
good-specifically, the good of friendship, which is for Aristotle the "greatest
external good." 4 The only true and complete friendships on the Aristotelian
paradigm are friendships of the good: Excellent people seek each other because
"solitude makes happiness impossible,"" and because "good people's life together
allows the cultivation of virtue."" Thus, true friendships are relatively stable
because virtue is enduring, and good people tend to stay good. An oddity of
this account-to be clear-is that only good people can have true friendships. 7
Obviously, Aristotle's conception of friendship could not be adopted into our
laws; among many other reasons, we do not like our laws taking a stand on who
is a good person.
Nevertheless, Aristotle is still careful to note that true friends may, on
occasion, be useful or advantageous or pleasant to each other.8" And although he
is clear that erotic and romantic love is another breed of relationship entirely,"
89
Aristotle does not preclude spouses from being friends of the highest sort.9"
Aristotle's canonical account of the highest form of friendship ultimately
confirms many of the characteristics adumbrated in the previous Subpart. For
81. See id. at bk. viii, ch. 3, 11. 1156a23-a 2 5 (utility friendships dissolve when the utility
itself diminishes); id. at bk. viii, ch. 3, II. 1156a31b4 (friendships of pleasure are very mercurial
because what pleasures us changes quickly).
82. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 3, 11. 1156bl1 -b13.
83. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 3, 1. 1156b6.
84. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 9, 11. 1 169b7-b10.
85. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 9, 1. I 169b 6.
86. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 9, 11. 1170a1 I-a15.
87. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 4,11. 1 157a1 8-a20; id. at bk. viii, ch. 5, 11. 1157b25-b28. This idea is
not merely idiosyncratic. See Etienne de La 10 tie, On Voluntary Servitude, in FREEDOM OVER
SERVITUDE: MONTAIGNE, LA BOETIE, AND ON VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 189, 220 (David Lewis
Schaefer ed. & trans., 1998) ("Friendship is a sacred word; it is a holy thing. It never occurs
except between honorable people .... It maintains itself not so much by means of good turns as by
a good life. What renders a friend assured of the other is the knowledge he has of his integrity.").
I have argued elsewhere, however, that La Boatie's account here may be less than fully honest.
See Leib, supra note 1, at 180-82.
88. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 4, 11. 1156b32-1157a4 (arguing that
complete and incomplete friendships are not mutually exclusive). John Cooper provides a
substantial defense for the claim that character friendships may have elements of the other,
incomplete forms. See Cooper, supra note 9, at 309.
89. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 4, 1. 1157a6-alO.
90. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 12, 11. 1162a25-a34.
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example, he requires friends to have a substantial level of equality91 and a degree
of concord between them.92 Also, he observes that friends must share "distress
and enjoyment,"93 spend time together,94 and trust each other.9" Friendship,
furthermore, must be active; distance does not necessarily dissolve friendships,
but prolonged absences will tend to do so.96 More, Aristotle requires that friends
must wish their counterparts well for their friend's own sake;9 his account
focuses upon reciprocity, and he claims that unreciprocated goodwill is not
constitutive of proper friendship.99 Finally, he requires that friends be mutually
aware of one another's reciprocated goodwill.'
There is, of course, some material in Aristotle that might seem, for lack of a
better word-weird-and these features have not been adopted in the account
above. For example, Aristotle is of the view that there is never any conflict in
true friendship;"°° that older people cannot be true friends because they are
unpleasant; 10 that true friends must live together; 2 that the paternal and mater-
nal relations in and of themselves are forms of friendship; 3 that friendship is a
form of self-love;' 4 and that all friends are good people. And Aristotle devotes
91. Id. atbk.viiich. 7,11. 1158b3O-b33;see asoid. atbk.viiich.5,1. 1157b37 ("[Fjriendship is
said to be equality.").
92. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 6, 11. 1167a22-b4. In particular, Aristotle emphasizes the need for concord in
generalized political or civic friendship. There is some debate about whether political friendship is
considered by Aristotle to be of the highest form of friendship. Compare Kronman, supra note 9, at 129,
130 (arguing that political friendship partakes of the highest form), and ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 155-56 (2d ed. 1984) (same), uith YACK, supra note 64, at 118-21
(arguing that Aristotle rejects all political theories that aim to inspire fraternity among citizens), Leib, supra
note 1, at 176 (arguing that political friendship is a low form of friendship), Cooper, supra note 9 (arguing
that civic friendship is most similar to a friendship of utility), and Richard Mulgan, The Role of Friendship in
Aristotle's Political Theory, in THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY, supra note 9, at 15(arguing that "fraternal" citizenship is impossible and that civic friendship is only instrumental).
93. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 4, 11.1166a7-a8.
94. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 4,11. 1166a6-a7.
95. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 4, 11. 1157a21-a25 (noting that trust arises only in the highest type of
friendships, as the other forms breed distrust).
96. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 5, 11. 1157b10-bl5.
97. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 3,11. 1155b31-b32; id. at bk. viii, ch. 3,11. 1156b10b12.
98. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 2,11. 1155b33-b34.
99. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 2,11. 1155b34-1156a6.
100. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 3,1. 1163a21.
101. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 5, 11. 1157b14-b18.
102. Id. at bk. viiich. 5, 11. 1157b18-b22; id. atbk. ix, ch. 1117. 171b29 tobk. ix, ch. 12J. 1172a1.
There is some ambiguity about whether Aristotle really means that friends must live under the same
roof or whether friends must simply seek out living in proximity to one another and share
"conversation and thought." Id. at bk. ix, ch. 9,11. 1170b10-b12.
103. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 12,11. 1161b15-b30.
104. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 8,11. 1168b8-1169b2. Ray Pahl also thinks through whether friendship is
based in self-love and narcissism. See PAHL, supra note 15, at 78. 1 address this issue infra Part lI.B.3.
105. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 5, i. 1157b25-b28. This view continues to
gain some adherents; some people seem to believe that friends never ask each other to tell lies to
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pages to puzzles that seem downright odd: whether it is better to have friends
in good fortune or bad fortune,1 6 and whether we can befriend ourselves in any
meaningful sense.' To be sure, some of these less familiar thoughts about friend-
ship that fail to resonate emerge from Aristotle's focus on the Greek concept
philia (or philos or philein), a relation that potentially includes a much broader set
of relations than our modem conception of friendship.' 8 But, all the same, we
can trace our modem conception of intimate friendship to Aristotle's catego-
ries-and especially to his elevation of a virtue or character friendship above
other, lesser, forms. Even if our own typologies differ from Aristotle's-and how
could they not given obvious cultural differences-we will always be indebted
cover for them and the like. But, as Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett recognize, "[A] good
friendship might well include a focus on certain vices." Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship
and Moral Danger, 97 J. PHIL. 278, 286 (2000). They go even further: "Heinrich Himmiler organized
the mass slaughter of Jewish people, but he may well have been a conscientious and loving .. .friend."
Id. at 288.
106. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 11, 11. I171a 2 1b29 (concluding that it is
"choiceworthy" to have friends "in all conditions").
107. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 4, 11. 1166a10-bl ("IT]here seems to be friendship Itoward oneself] in
so far as someone is two or more parts.").
108. See Devere, supra note 73, at 153-54 (citing many scholars who see philia as a extending
more broadly than a circle of intimate friends); see also Baron, supra note 9, at 837 n.1 (considering
philia to be constituted by "personal ties of many sorts, including but not restricted to parental
love, other family ties, bonds between co-workers or members of the same political organization or
church, etc., as well as love between spouses or lovers, and friendship"); Susan Bickford, Beyond
Friendship: Aristotle on Conflict, Deliberation, and Attention, 58 J. POL. 398, 407 (1996) ("ITIhe
Greeks used philia to denote a wider range of relationships than does our ordinary understanding of
'friendship': relations between business partners, family members, citizens, fellow travelers, and
personal friends, among others.") (citation omitted); Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note
18, at 207 ("Philein referred ... to a relationship and specifically to membership in an institutional
and hence legal group-the family, the city, the state."). But see David Konstan, Greek Friendship,
117 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 71, 92 (1996) (arguing that "the Greeks themselves were, like us, quite clear
about the difference between friends, relatives, and countrymen"); Jonathan Powell, Friendship and
Its Problems in Greek and Roman Thought, in ETHICS AND RHETORIC: CLASSICAL ESSAYS FcR
DONALD RUSSELL ON HIS 75TH BIRTHDAY 31, 45 (Doreen Innes, Harry Hine & Christopher Pelling
eds., 1995) (arguing that philia "contains nothing essentially unfamiliar to the modern reader" because
"friendship in its essence is much the same for human beings in all societies").
A similar debate structures the interpretation of the Roman "amicitia." Compare EPSTEIN, supra
note 16, at 60-61 (explaining that the term "is said to have had its origin in party politics" and "much
of it seems to turn on what we today call networking"), Devere, supra note 73, at 155 (discussing
whether the term "is equivalent to our understanding of friendship or whether it is more commonly
used to refer to patron-client relationships"), and Goodrich, The Immense Rumrr, supra note 18, at
207 ("Amicitia was ... a term that referred to institutional relationships, to 'group consciousness' and to
what would later be termed legal rights. The referent of amicitia was originally that of the kin group,
and latterly came to refer to fellow citizens or members of the polity, of the same legally defined
group."), with Powell, supra, at 45 (maintaining that the Roman term, like the Greek term, is similar
to our own concept of friendship), and David Konstan, Patrons and Friends, 90 CLASSICAL
PHILOLOGY 328 (1995) (same).
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to his account and can learn much from his insistence that there are different
forms and species of friendships that command different types of attention.
Some final lessons from Aristotle continue to ring true: One can befriend
too many people.'" Because friendship is the product of tremendous effort...
and requires true sharing of grief, distress, and celebration,"' a person can spread
herself too thin."2 And, perhaps more insightfully, Aristotle notes that when
disputes arise in friendships, the tension is often traceable to a transition within
the friendship from one species to another;" 3 indeed, "friends are most at odds
when they are not friends in the way they think they are,""' 4 when one party
misleads the other into thinking a different kind of friendship exists. We would
do well to remember all of these insights as we endeavor to construct a
workable concept of the friend that the law could employ.
* **
So much for the descriptive part of this project. As should be obvious,
although much of the account of friendship in Part I.B draws from Aristotle, my
working definition of the friend does not classify itself neatly into the Aristotelian
category of the virtue or character friendship. I am ultimately working with a
different definition of the friend, and I do not have the same expectations of the
friend's virtue as Aristotle. Contrary to Aristotle's account, my account excludes
from consideration spousal friendship, familial friendship, erotic friendship, civic
friendship, and, more generally, the friendship of unequals.
Still, Aristotle's discussion furnishes a nice segue into the normative inquiry
that constitutes Part II: Should the law recognize the status of the friend?
Indeed, some argue that even the English word friendship itself underwent a similarly ambiguous
phase in the eighteenth century, where "[t]he word 'could mean a distant or close relation, a patron or a
client, an individual to whom one was tied by mutual sponsorship, or someone attached by warm
affection."' Silver, supra note 15, at 1487 (quoting RANDOLF TRUMBACH, THE RISE OF THE
EGALITARIAN FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY ENGLAND 64 (1978)).
109. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 6, 11. 1158all-a12; accord ALLAN,
FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 42-43 (arguing that we all have limited capacities for the number of
friends we can manage).
110. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 7,1. 1168a22.
111. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 10, 11. 1171a5-a8.
112. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 10, 11. 1171a2-a4. As Aristotle puts it, it "seems impossible to be an
extremely close friend to many people." Id. at bk. ix, ch. 10, 11. ll71alO-al 1; see also id. at bk. ix,
ch. 10, 11. 171a16-a17 ("Those who have many friends and treat everyone as close to them seem to
be friends to no one, except in a fellow citizen's way. These people are regarded as ingratiating.").
113. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 13,11. 1162b25-b26.
114. Id. at bk. ix, ch. 3, 11. 1165b7-b8.
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Aristotle does not have a well-developed response to the question, but he does
offer some stimulating thoughts, ones that may be helpful to introduce the topic.
First, he suggests that friends have no need for justice."' It is not perfectly
clear what he means by this; but it might mean that the law and legally enforced
justice have no place between friends."6 Support for this reading can be found in
Aristotle's approving citation of the practice of some cities where "there are
actually laws prohibiting legal actions in voluntary bargains [presumably between
friends], on the assumption that if we have trusted someone we must dissolve the
association with him on the same tenns on which he formed it.""' 7 Similarly, in
drawing a distinction between "rules friendships" and "character friendships,"
Aristotle suggests that rules friends use explicit conditions for their contractual
and debt arrangements, whereas character friends allow grace periods and
transact much less formally. In these latter cases, Aristotle observes, "some cities
do not allow legal actions .... but think that people who have forned an
arrangement on the basis of trust must put up with the outcome."' "s
Ironically, Aristotle appears to endorse a legal recognition of the friend pre-
cisely by denying friends any benefit of legal enforcement to their arrange-
ments (even if they are of traditional transactional forms). This is a provocative
thought that endorses the idea that friends should live outside the law-or at
least under their own, special, legal rules. And Aristotle furnishes a typology of
friendship so that the law can figure out who shall be excluded from its pur-
view-character friends, in particular. Part II argues that the law should pro-
tect the status of the friend in a more substantial way than merely denying friends
access to the legal system.
II. WHY SHOULD FRIENDSHIP MATTER?
Friendship is so obviously a good in the world that it is hard to justify allo-
cating space to defending its goodness. Indeed, to define it is already to embark
upon a nonative project of explaining why it is a central good in most people's
115. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 1,1. 1155a 28.
116. It might also mean that once one shows oneself capable of having friends, one is assured
of being a good and just person such that friends have no need to cultivate the virtue of justice in
addition to cultivating friendship. Or it could mean that since a friend is a "second self," a friend
never needs to worry about just distribution: Self-preservation and self-love will lead to proper
distribution, even without an external norm of justice. For this latter argument, see Leib, supra note
1, at 174.
117. Aristotle, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 1, 11. 1164b12-b15. Somewhat inexplicably, this
discussion of friendship and the law in Aristotle remains virtually unnoticed by the generations of
extensive commentary upon Aristotle's lectures.
118. Id. at bk. viii, ch. 13,11. 1162b22-b32.
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lives. Yet to argue that the law should recognize the status of the friend requires
more carefully specifying the role friends play both in private and public life.
But even that will not be enough to justify legal recognition, of course,
because the law is not designed to protect and recognize all human goods. Nice
shaving cream is a good, but it obviously should get no special legal pro-
tection. Lollipops are goods for children (from their perspective, anyway), but
it would be odd to argue that the law should protect and develop children's
rights to lollipops.
Yet the panoply of friendship's benefits I expose here illustrates that
friendship is not just any good; it is an "indispensable component of a good
life."' 19 And it is especially indispensable to the kind of good life our society
prizes: lives with deep private and personal connections. If one believes that our
legal system should develop and facilitate the acquisition of capabilities that
render our lives dignified and meaningful, the law should find a way to support,
recognize, and promote friendship. But there are many other reasons for the law
to respect friendship.
Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 explore friendship's benefits in the private and
public spheres, respectively, emphasizing those that recommend the support of a
legal regime like our own, one committed to liberal rights and a flourishing
economy. Then, Part II.B parries some core objections to the enterprise of
making friendship matter in the law.
A. The Affirmative Case
1. Personal Advantages
Friendship confers a series of personal benefits in our daily lives. These
benefits are not necessarily available exclusively through friendship, but
friendship furnishes them plentifully.
First, friendship is central in identity exploration, identity formation,
identity development, and identity maintenance.1 20 "Shopping" for friends and
trying to get along with various people in intimate ways allow us to learn
more about who we are and who we most want to become.' Our sustained
119. Stroud, supra note 9, at 518.
120. See, e.g., ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 1, 107, 111 (arguing that friends help
provide us with our sense of identity and help us express it); Cocking & Kennett, supra note 105,
at 285 ("[Friends contribute to each other's self-conception."); O'Connor, supra note 61, at 117 (noting
that we can shape our identities in friendships); Oliker, supra note 32, at 18, 24 (contending that
friendship is expressive of identity).
121. See Cocking & Kennett, supra note 105, at 286 ("As a friend, I am partly determined
by my friend's interpretations of me .... "); O'Connor, supra note 61, at 118 ("Friendship offers a
654 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 631 (2007)
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friendships ultimately constitute, in some measure, our very identity, and
maintaining relationships through time helps the continuity of our identity
through different life stages and substantial life challenges. Healthy friend-
ships allow us room to develop our identities further, and they provide oppor-
tunities for a sense of self-selected identity outside of our institutional
affiliations through work, education, and kin.' More, friendship can be "the
most fertile ground for acquiring the moral sensibilities."'
2 3
Second, and relatedly, friends confirm our sense of social and moral
worth.' They allow us to feel "cared for and loved, that [we are] esteemed and
valued, and that [we] belong[] to a network of communication and mutual
obligation."''2  Indeed, "Islelf-esteem, the most important disposition associated
with happiness and a prime protector against depression, is... closely related to
friendship."'26  Friendlessness causes depression, and friends help us avoid
deep sadness.'
27
To be sure, our families and extended kin networks also provide many of
these benefits, but friendship is perhaps an even greater confirmation of social
and moral worth because friendship relations tend to be chosen in a deeper
sense-whereas we are usually stuck with our families. ' Some have found that it
is friendship rather than money, commodities, or family that buys us happiness.
29
Not only do friends help us avoid depression, they are more generally
good for our health: Friends "appear to reduce the levels of stress experienced
way of inventing and re-inventing the self in an authentic way throughout one's life."); Nancy
Sherman, Aristotle on the Shared Life, in FRIENDSHIP: A PHILOSOPHICAL READER 91, 105-06 (Neera
Kapur Badhwar ed., 1993) (stating that friends help their counterparts "develop ... more completely"
and are "eminently suited as models to be emulated"); Lynn Smith-Lovin & J. Miller McPherson, You
Are Who You Know: A Network Approach to Gender, in THEORY ON GENDER/FEMINISM ON THEORY 223
(Paula England ed., 1993) (describing how differences in the relationships men and women form during
development affect identity and behavioral differences between genders later in life).
122. As Graham Allan has written, "[I]t is evident that [friends] are major influences on the
ways in which children, and indeed adults in later life, come to define themselves as social beings
and develop an image of their self." ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 1.
123. LAURENCE THOMAS, LIVING MORALLY: A PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL CHARAC=ER 153 (1989).
124. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 1.
125. James S. House, Social Support and the Quality and Quantity of Life, in RESEARCH ON
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 253, 255 (Frank M. Andrews ed., 1986) (quoting Sidney Cobb, Social Support as
a Moderator of Life Stress, 38 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 300 (1976)).
126. Robert E. Lane, The Road Not Taken: Friendship, Consumerism, and Happiness, 8 CRITICAL
REV. 521, 530 (1994).
127. See id. at 525-26; see also ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 1 ("[W]e tend to think of
people with lots of friends as most likely to be happy and those without as often lonely and
unfortunate."); SPENCER & PAHL, supra note 15, at 28 (reporting that those with low levels of social
support tend to suffer from more mental illness and have a harder time recovering therefrom).
128. Obviously, most of us choose our spouses too. Still, we can dispense with friends more
easily, and our larger family circle is not chosen in the way our friendship networks are.
129. See Lane, supra note 126, at 527.
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[by their counterparts], improve health, and buffer the impact of stress on
health."'30 Although there was a time when sociologists concluded that "friend-
ship plays a very small part in the overall pattern of support and care" of the
"chronically ill and handicapped"'' 1 and that kin is more likely to perform these
tasks, more recent evidence suggests that those with close friends and confidants
live longer than those without them-and that "close family ties... ha[vel no
discernible effect on survival."'32
More, friendship is "linked to the provision of public services so as to
enhance both efficiency and community""' and can furnish important emotional
and financial aid in times of crisis when public services are overextended 34: "The
closer and stronger our tie with someone, the broader the scope of their support
for us and the greater the likelihood that they will provide major help in a
crisis."'35 So, close friends are critical in the provision of care and keep us healthy
and safe.
Finally, friends can inspire innovation and creativity in our professional and
personal lives, giving rise to new modalities of thought.'36 By serving as a respite
from other more formal social roles and obligations,'37 friendship facilitates our
sense of control over our own lives, helps us to be authentic, and furnishes us
130. House, supra note 125, at 253; see also SPENCER & PAHL, supra note 15, at 28
(reporting that many causes of death disproportionately affect those who are isolated).
131. ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 110.
132. Nicholas Bakalar, Bonds of Friendship, Not Family, May Add Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2005, at F6. To be fair, kin may still be providing most of the care; it is just that survival from
that care is facilitated by friendship, and having close family ties has no effect on the care leading
to survival.
133. Silver, supra note 15, at 1495 (citing MARTIN BULMER, NEIGHBORS: THE WORK OF
PHILIP ABRAMS (1986)).
134. See Ely Portillo, Feeling Alone? You're Not the Only One, HOUSTON CHRON., June 22, 2006,
at Al, available at 2006 WLNR 10916753.
135. Miller McPherson et al., Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks
over Two Decades, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 353, 355 (2006) (citing Barry Wellman & Scot Wortley,
Different Strokes from Different Folks: Community Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. Soc. 558 (1990);
Jeanne S. Hurlbert et al., Core Networks and Tie Activation: What Kinds of Routine Networks Allocate
Resources in Nonroutine Situations?, 65 AM. Soc. REV. 598 (2000)). This sociological observation
is true of both kin and non-kin ties, but for reasons already adumbrated, I am not discussing kin-
based ties in this project.
136. See LEWIS, supra note 14, at 81 ("What we now call 'the Romantic Movement' once
was Mr. Wordsworth and Mr. Coleridge talking incessantly (at least Mr. Coleridge was) about a
secret vision of their own. Communism, Tractarianism, Methodism, the movement against
slavery, the Reformation, the Renaissance, might perhaps be said, without much exaggeration, to
have begun in the same way."). For a book-length treatment of this very theme, see FARRELL,
supra note 16 (exploring how friendship contributes to the arts and sciences through studies of,
inter alia, C.S. Lewis, Sigmund Freud, Susan B. Anthony, Joseph Conrad, and their friends), and
EPSTEIN, supra note 12 (exploring friendship's role in the poetry of postwar America).
137. See Dorothy Jerrome, Good Company: The Sociological Implications of Friendship, 32 SOC.
REV. 696, 709-12 (1984).
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with a greater sense of individual autonomy. This freedom can open up for us
new ways of thinking. Friends help us remain the same, but they also help us grow.
2. Public Advantages
Many of these personal benefits create a windfall for society more gener-
ally. For example, the state clearly reaps a public health benefit from friends who
take care of the sick and handicapped, a cost that Medicaid or Medicare need
not absorb if there are able-bodied friends willing and able to pitch in."' And if
Robert Lane is right, "[a]dvanced societies are likely to increase 'utility' if they
maximize friendship rather than the getting and spending of wealth."'' 9  The
avoidance of depression that friends accomplish has ramifications for our
capital markets and may help the state with economic growth.
Friendship facilitates economic growth in a few other ways as well. In the
first place, as noted above, close social networks promote individual freedom and
creativity, 4 which have real market effects. Second, "amity... is desirable and
conducive to business" because we are more likely to contract with those whom
we trust.'4 Friendship is, after all, "closely related to contractual agreement and
reciprocal behavior,""'4 and contracts and the collaborations that make them
work lie at the center of our liberal market institutions.' Third, and relatedly,
friendships establish paradigmatic examples of interpersonal trust, central to
smooth operations of a market: "[I]nstead of demanding purely calculating
behavior, markets require interpersonal trust." '144 Friendships are especially well-
suited to the creation and reinforcement of the interpersonal trust critical to
helping the market function.
There are even more public benefits that could accrue to the state if it
promoted friendship more directly. Friendships have the potential to save a legal
system enforcement costs because transactions based in friendships often do
138. Friendship can also help sustain volunteer networks that in turn provide important public
services. See Portillo, supra note 134 ("Red Cross volunteering [is] an effort for which friends often
are recruiters and in which friendships sustain membership.").
139. See Lane, supra note 126, at 521.
140. See Adams, supra note 39, at 176 (citing sociologist Georg Simmel).
141. Lisa Hill & Peter McCarthy, Hume, Smith and Ferguson: Friendship in Commercial Society,
in THE CHALLENGE TO FRIENDSHIP IN MODERNITY, supra note 9, at 33, 35. This is in some tension,
of course, with the old adage that we only contract with those whom we do not trust.
142. BRAIN, supra note 13, at 37.
143. On contract and collaboration, see generally Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration,
113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004); Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the
General Theory of Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2005). For a discussion about how contract and
collaboration underwrite our liberal market institutions, see Markovits, supra, at 1515-18.
144. Lane, supra note 126. at 533.
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not require the law for monitoring. Norms internal to friendship can successfully
police party behavior and save the legal system effort in the process. The values
of friendship and its commitments to reciprocity and goodwill lubricate and
underwrite economic transactions.
To be sure, friendship also has its very real economic costs: In Andalusia, for
instance, "[s]ome farmers [have] complain[ed] that friendship obligations force
them to sell at a loss, or part with an object they would otherwise not have
sold." '145 Yet these costs are arguably counterbalanced by the costs friends save in
not needing to rely on the relatively more expensive norm-enforcement
techniques furnished by the law.
Of course, it cannot be that the law should provide room and recognition
for all extrinsic norms that could potentially save a legal system enforcement
costs. Many nonlegal regimes of social organization can furnish this benefit, and
surely the law cannot give special status to all extrinsic norms. But friendship's
norms are especially useful for the law because those norms are centrally ones the
legal system should stand ready to endorse. We basically like equality, reciproc-
ity, and reasonable reliance in economic transactions, and if friendships can pro-
vide those desiderata, the law should support them."'
145. BRAIN, supra note 13, at 110.
146. Perhaps an analogy would be helpful here. One of the law-and-society movement's most
robust and famous findings is that extrinsic norms outside the law bring civility to business relations.
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55
(1963) (concluding that norms of fair dealing are as relevant as legal rules in Wisconsin business firm
transactions); James J. White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth
Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1982) (describing how chemical companies allocate
supply during shortages according to extrinsic norms, not the law); see also ELLICKSON, supra note 56,
at 235 (finding that cattle ranchers in Shasta County order their transactions according to extrinsic
norms). The contract law surrounding the sale of goods, at least, is able to make use of background
extrinsic norms through its recognition of and deference to "usage of trade." See U.C.C. § 1-303
(2004). In so doing, it saves enforcement costs by recognizing a prior not-necessarily-legal relationship.
But see Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 417
(1977) (suggesting that exclusive informal enforcement methods may be more efficient than the
possibility for legal sanctions in certain gratuitous and altruistic transactions because legal enforcement
may waste resources and incentivize overreliance).
Yet it only makes sense to allow extrinsic norms to penetrate the legal system and gain legal
recognition if the norms themselves (as a general matter) are consistent with the law's normative
framework. Since the Uniform Commercial Code is explicitly designed "to permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom [and] usage," U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2), the law
welcomes extrinsic norms in this context. Perhaps there is an assumption that certain customs are
efficient, and that the law is more efficient when it temporarily makes use of extrinsic norms to
police behavior. But see Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999) (arguing that customs and usages of
trade cannot be easily identified and do not arise frequently); Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient
Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859 (2006) (highlighting the relatively cool
reception custom and extrinsic norms have received by the law outside of the contract and
international law contexts); see also The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cit. 1932) (Hand, J.)
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This is a tad too facile, so I should say more. If "members of tight social
groups will informally encourage each other to engage in cooperative behav-
ior,"047 it would be sensible for the law to facilitate such bonding-for the state's
own benefit. When people are engaged in close relationships of cooperation,
collaboration, and reciprocity-as friends usually are-the law may find that its
norms are better channeled through the extrinsic norms already available to the
close-knit group, 4 ' an excellent reason to grant friends special status within a
legal system. "I]he more close-knit a group is, the better [the friends] will be
able to use its informal-control system to minimize the sum of transaction costs
and deadweight losses""-and the more the status of friend demands special
recognition, precisely because friendship performs the function of law. The law
need not impose its own foreign norms when they are so readily attended to
through an external norm system that it can endorse and underwrite."' Just as
the law can and should acknowledge enmity in developing legal remedies"'-it
fails to do so only through paying greater costs of enforcement-it should and
can acknowledge friendships.
Some go even further and suggest that vast swaths of our legal system are
themselves predicated on friendship, and that our law would not be possible
without an underlying conception of friendship undergirding it. Perhaps certain
(remarking that "there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not
excuse their omission"); Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History
of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992) (analyzing when it makes sense for
courts to integrate custom between parties into dispute resolution).
147. ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 167. Obviously, Ellickson's "tight social groups" are not
necessarily coextensive with the category of friendships (indeed, they are meant to be much broader).
But there is nothing in his analysis that would suggest that friendships operate differently. Indeed, in
defining the term "close-knit group," Ellickson writes, "A group is close-knit when informal power is
broadly distributed among group members and the infonnation pertinent to infonral control circulates
easily among them." Id. at 177-78. Friendship's internal norms of equality and reciprocity-and their
operation within friendship-make this description accurate of friendship as well. Yet friendship,
despite its commitment to equality and reciprocity, tends not to establish wealth redistribution. See
supra note 57. Ellickson also suggests that this is true of his close-knit groups (although he is open to
their developing certain forms of charity, as we would expect to see in friendships on occasion also).
See ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 176-77.
148. See ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 178 n.38 (reporting on a study of the remote island of
Tristan da Cunha in the South Atlantic in which a small cooperative society was able to dispense with a
criminal justice system altogether) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 31-33 (1984)).
149. Id. at 177 n.35.
150. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deferrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1997).
151. See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 2010 (2001) ("Money
damages are the superior remedy when the [injuryl creates anger and hard feelings .... Injunctions
are more suitable when emotion is unlikely to interfere with bargaining."). But see Ward Farnsworth,
The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (2002) (arguing that courts should usually ignore
enmity in awarding remedies-with some notable exceptions-for a variety of economic and
institutional competence rationales).
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norms within contract and tort, for example, themselves had their genesis in
friendship's commands. This is Peter Goodrich's provocative idea. And although
he sees friendship as a "special kind of law," he thinks it "introduces caritas into
the practice of legality, and it is precisely from this concept of care that comes
the primary private law bond of community-the 'duty of care' that we owe to
our neighbor in the law of obligations." '52 If the law is parasitic upon the friend
for its own normative structure, perhaps the law owes the friend the privilege of
being recognized.'53
This is, to be sure, getting more and more abstract. But there are a few final
things to be said about friendship's benefits for the political sphere more
generally, beyond its contribution to public health, our economic system, and the
law. Friendship can also be a resource for social integration"5 and political
cohesion"55 : Citizens can be made to care about their polities and contribute to
public life when they realize that their friendships and their friends' lives are at
stake within the same polity. I might not participate in public affairs or care
much about the commonweal if it cannot touch my private life. But if I see that
politics affect my friends, I might be more likely to become involved and feel
a general solidarity with my broader community.'56 As Aristotle understood,
friendship ultimately contributes to the moral worth of the state: "[F]riendship
would seem to hold cities together."'57  In interpreting this credo, Anthony
Kronman reads it this way: "mhe best safeguard against political revolution is a
stable spirit of friendship among the members of the pulis.... This is why, for the
continued existence of the polis, justice is not enough. There must also be
friendship among its citizens.'
58
152. Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note 18, at 213.
153. See Sally F. Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Object of Study, 7 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 719 (1973) (arguing that "fictive friendships" undergird
most American business transactions, in which parties routinely use informal modes of address,
exchange favors and gifts, and act "chummy"); see also MACAULEY ET AL., supra note 48, at 230 n.3 ("A
lawyer who deals with contracts and fails to understand the power and the limits of trust and the
social sanctions flowing from 'fictive friendships' is incompetent.").
154. See ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 108.
155. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 67 (1956) (finding that patterns of friendship
contribute to political integration, "democratic unionism," and a broad sense of community).
156. I make this argument at greater length in Leib, supra note 1, at 16748.
157. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. viii, ch. 1, 1. 1155a23. See generally RONALD BEINER,
POLITICAL JUDGMENT 79 (1983) (emphasizing the centrality of friendship to Aristotle's conception of
politics); Kronman, supra note 9 (explaining how, for Aristotle, friendship can hold cities together).
158. Kronman, supra note 9, at 126. Although Kronman is ultimately interested in a
generalized civic friendship, this idea holds true for the promotion of deep friendship ties within the
polity as well.
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There are some who might object to protecting friends because there are
too many of them and because the class is too expansive to warrant protection.
Yet, the most recent study on friendship in the sociology literature confirms that
most people in the United States think they have only two close friends, and one
in four people say they have no one with whom they can discuss important mat-
ters." 9 This is not a hopelessly large class of people that will get special treat-
ment. And to reap the benefits that accrue from a society composed of close-knit
friendship networks, the institution needs greater support and promotion.
More generally, it is worth taking note that friendship is on the decline.'60 For
all the reasons adumbrated here, friendship sorely needs and deserves the support of
our public institutions to help it flourish. As a recent newspaper report observes:
Weakening bonds of friendship, which [many] studies affirm, have far-
reaching effects. Among them: fewer people to turn to for help in crises
such as Hurricane Katrina, fewer watchdogs to deter neighborhood crime,
fewer visitors for hospital patients and fewer participants in community
groups. The decline, which was greatest in estimates of the number of
friends outside the family, also puts added pressure on spouses, families
and counselors.
16
'
The decline of friendship is a serious finding and commands the attention
of lawyers, public policymakers, judges, and legal scholars. The law can indeed
help protect friendship-but the law has thus far failed to take friendships
sufficiently seriously and appreciate its role in regulating them. Of course, it is
not obvious that legal recognition will lead to an increase in the actual number
159. See McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 358-59 (comparing the results of General Social
Surveys from 1985 and 2004 and noting that the percentage of people who talk to at least one person
who is not connected to them through kinship declined from 80.1 to 57.2 percent during this period);
see also Portillo, supra note 134 (analyzing the McPherson et al. study). To be fair, it is not obvious
that this study's subject is friendship as defined supra Part I.
160. See McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 362 ("Both kin and non-kin ties have decreased,
although the change is larger in nonfamily ties."); see also Peter Bearman & Paolo Parigi, Cloning Headless
Frogs and OtIier Important Matters: Conversation Topics and Netuork Structure, 83 S)C. FORCES 535, 547
(2004) (finding that 20 percent of respondents have no one with whom they can discuss important
matters); Pamela Paxton, Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator
Assessment, 105 AM. J. SOc. 88 (1999) (confirming that socializing with friends and neighbors is on the
decline). But see McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 366 ("In 1990, for example, the Gallup Poll found
that only 3 percent of their sample reported no close friends; only 16 percent had less than three friends.
While there are many differences between the Gallup and [General Social Surveys that fonn the basis of
the McPherson et al., supra note 135, conclusions], this raises the interesting question of whether the
important-matters question gets at closer, core ties than the concept of close friend. Another recent
telephone survey by [the Pew Internet and American Life Project] also found much larger numbers of
core or close friends, when it asked about a combination of types of contact."); see also BOASE ET AL.,
supra note 39 (reporting the results of the Pew Internet and American Life project, which has Americans
claiming an average of twenty-three core or very close ties).
161. Portillo, supra note 134.
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 661 2006-2007
662 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 631 (2007)
or quality of friendships within society. But, at the very least, we need some
account of the law's relationship to friendship. We need to remain mindful that
legal rules will have some effect on this most important social institution and
social resource that allows us to function and furnishes us with dignity, integrity,
and well-being.
B. Parrying Objections
Admittedly, my thesis is counterintuitive. Nevertheless, here, I give some
form to the sorts of objections that likely structure people's intuition that this is a
bizarre-and bad-idea. In doing so, this Subpart aims to show why people's intui-
tions may be wrong.
In setting up my affirmative case, I have already addressed the first problem
that plagues this enterprise: defining who counts as a friend. That is the first
hurdle in getting the law to recognize friendship. Part I settled on a definition
that does not idealize only the highest species of friendships (of Aristotle's
typology) but one that respects a wider circle of affection. I furnished a list of
attributes that the law could potentially use so that inquiring into friendship
would not be a mere "know-it-when-I-see-it" affair. Think of the list in Part I.B
as a proposed ten-part, nonexclusive test for determining whether a person is a
friend for the purposes of the law in some hypothetical Restatement (First) of the
Law of Friendship.'62
To be sure, there is good symbolic reason to keep friendship out of law and
the law out of friendship. Goodrich is illustrative:
[Tihe judge must recuse him or herself from judging friends, the attorney
cannot properly represent or act for a cause in which he or she has an
interest or amity, and affect indeed is supposed to play no part in the
concatenations or elaborations of law. The order of law is predicated upon
a refusal to deal with friendship and so it institutes a non-recognition of
the friend ... 163
Indeed, keeping friendship out of law helps keep the law impartial and free from
affect and eros, an obvious Western liberal good. 4 But the law's appropriate
162. While multifactor tests to ascertain whether a party qualifies for a legal status are common,
the obvious analogy here is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcY § 220 (1958). The Restatement
there offers a ten-part, nonexclusive test for determining if a worker is a servant or an independent
contractor, from which status flows certain duties and privileges. My set of factors-with their
explanations-is not as pithy as § 220, but provides more guidance in delimiting the category. Of
course, more work and debate is warranted, and it may be that we need a variable concept, depending
on the particular issue area in which the status of friend becomes relevant. Mine is only a starting point.
163. Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note 18, at 203.
164. See id. at 222-23.
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posture of impartiality to repel criticisms of "cronyism and nepotism"'' 61 does not
justify a complete nonrecognition of the relationships of friendship in society,
and it is hardly clear that the law can rid itself of cronyism without some theory
of when a friendship triggers a partiality to which the law must respond (by a
demand for recusal if nothing else). While Part III of this Article rebuts the case
that the law is successful in any thoroughgoing campaign of "non-recognition,"
this Subpart develops five more potential theoretical objections to my enterprise.
1. Keeping the Private Sphere Private
Most obviously, perhaps the law and friendship should not intermingle
because we tend to think of our friendships as quintessentially voluntary and
the law as quintessentially coercive.'66 Allowing the law to penetrate friendship
in any way might threaten friendship's core and undermine its defining charac-
teristic. One could go further too: Friendship and keeping it private is central to
our freedom;6 7 without friendship's privacy we might have no authentic personal
relations outside the control of the state. 6
Indeed, according to a widely discussed reading of the thinkers of the
Scottish Enlightenment (David Hume, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, and
Adam Ferguson),.69 both a healthy commercial society and friendship itself func-
tion much better when the public economic system takes no special notice of
friendship. 7 The logic is as follows: Friendship prospers best when there is a
165. Id. at 229.
166. See id. at 223 ("Banishing friendship to the rites of passage or ceremonies of death keeps it
hygienically private and squarely in the safety of 'another context."'); Silver, supra note 15, at 1476
("[F]riendship in modem society is a quintessentially private relationship, not normatively constituted
by public roles and obligations-[and] indeed often in distinction from them."); see also BRAIN, supra
note 13, at 75 ("Friendship should be 'free,' 'pure,' and based on moral obligations alone.").
167. See Silver, supra note 15, at 1477 ("Since personal relations other than friendship are to
some extent constituted by public or ascriptive statuses, friendship more fully meets the criterion of
nonsubstitutability as a prototype of the personal.").
168. This objection might be cast in terms of "commodification": "Marx, T6nnies, and others of
the anticapitalist Left hold that commodification renders personal relations alienated and morally
corrupt." Id. And if friendship becomes just another legal category that can be enforced with the power
of the state, it risks being commodified, resulting in alienation and moral corruption. For a new and
exciting collection on commodification, see RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN
LAW ANI) CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). The classic starting point in the
legal literature is, of course, Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
169. See, e.g., Hill & McCarthy, supra note 141 (arguing that Adam Smith and David Hume
share this view but that Adam Ferguson does not); Silver, supra note 15 (presenting a unified account of
these thinkers without rigorously distinguishing among their individual views); Allan Silver, 'Two
Different Sorts of Commerce'-Friendship and Strangership in Civil Society, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 43 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan
Kumar eds., 1997).
170. See Silver, supra note 15, at 1474.
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separate sphere of public commercial transactions because such a separation helps
demarcate friendship as noninstrumental. Before there was a public commercial
sphere, it was more difficult to tell who was a true friend and who was being
befriended for commercial gain. Once a public economic sphere emerged, however,
it became easier to signal who is a true intimate and who is a mere business partner.
As applied in our current debate, one might agree with the Scots and argue
that keeping friendship private helps "purify [it] by clearly distinguishing friend-
ship from interest and founding friendship on sympathy and affection." ''
Keeping the market (and, by extension, the law that governs it) free from con-
siderations of friendship serves friendship best. A market society that ignores
friendship makes it more likely that we will be able to make authentic friends
because we can credibly signal to them that the friendship is not fundamentally
about exchange."7
From another perspective, keeping friendship private also potentially
serves the economy best at the same time. Adam Smith imagined this dynamic
functioning in two ways. First, natural intimate friendship in the private sphere
helps to generate sympathy and trust in society, facilitating the market econ-
omy without overriding it.'73 Second, friendship helps to establish "stranger-
ship" in the public sphere, which is useful to the economy as follows: When true
friendships emerge in the private sphere, people no longer see those with whom
they do not do business as enemies or competitors but as strangers with whom
they can have disinterested transactions. 74 Strangers in commercial society are
not "charged with uncertain and menacing possibilities" but are "authentically
indifferent co-citizens--the sort of indifference that enables all to make con-
tracts with all."'75 Thus, private friendship is aided by the market and, in turn,
aids the market's functioning.
171. Id. at 1487; see also id. at 1480 ("The Scots celebrate the liberation of friendship from
instrumental concerns made possible by the advent of commercial society.").
172. See Adams & Allan, supra note 32, at 11.
173. See SMITH, supra note 49, at 220, 223-25; ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION 29 (1989) (arguing in the tradition of Adam Smith that private
friendships are very useful to commerce because the natural sympathy of friendship has the capacity to
"enrich and deepen [our] moral obligations to one another"); Silver, supra note 15, at 1481 (describing
Smith's argument that friendship based on "natural sympathy... is not exclusivistic, like fictive kinship
and clientage," which are typical forms of precommercial personal solidarity," but rather that friendship
"reflects a new universalism in civil society"); id. at 1483-84 ("Smith applauds the advent of sympathetic
personal relations not because... they weaken traditional or mercantile constraints on market exchanges,
but because the new forms of friendship help shape a civil society free of exclusivistic relationships hostile or
suspicious toward others.").
174. See Silver, supra note 15, at 1482-83 (analyzing the benefits of"strangership" for Adam
Smith's theory of the market); Hill & McCarthy, supra note 141, at 41 (same).
175. Silver, supra note 15, at 1482-83.
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These are serious challenges to any project that tries to get the public sphere
to do more to facilitate, recognize, and promote private friendship. Such inter-
vention into the private sphere risks unsettling the balance between private and
public that allows our liberal society to function. There are, nevertheless, a few
things one can say in response. In the first place, many of these arguments merely
serve to highlight again the very significance of friendship to our economy and
society. That only reminds us how urgent it is to protect friendship and enable it
to flourish. Even if we choose to retain friendship's core as a private relationship
rather than one with public recognition that carries duties and privileges, there
remains good reason to give the legal system competence to recognize
friendship-even if only to keep a hands-off policy to it.
One must also challenge the basic supposition that friendship is purely vol-
untarist, that friendship lays exclusively in the private sphere of personal
choice.1 Indeed, much of the sociological literature about friendship seeks to
establish that friendship is relatively constrained by social structure and stratifica-
tionS77: "[Friendship is not just a voluntary or freely chosen relationship. It is one
which is patterned and structured in a variety of ways by factors which can be
recognised, at least to some degree, as genuinely.., outside the individual's
immediate control."''7  The details of this stratification and the limitations
imposed upon friendship are explored in the next two Subparts, but the central
point is nevertheless important here: Fetishizing the voluntariness of friendships
is misguided because structural stratification-govered by rules of state and soci-
ety-predetermines many of our friendships and their concomitant commitments.
Given this sociological reality, the idea that the law should stay out of our
friendships is at least naive: The law makes possible and structures friendships,
whether it does so consciously or not. Accordingly, pretending that the law has
nothing to do with our friendships is not a plausible posture. As cultural envi-
ronments and their enabling conditions within the law change, so do friendship
patterns and processes. ' And the forms of intimacy friendships display in any
cultural context are no doubt affected by the law and legal categories."s
Moreover, consider the family: It is something we tend to think of as a
quintessentially private relation-indeed, it constitutes the very core of the
176. As Liz Spencer and Ray Pahl show in their new book on friendship, we too easily assume
friendship to be a chosen relationship and family to be a given one. We actually can view friends as given
and family as chosen too. See SPENCER & PAHL, sulyra note 15, at chs. 2, 5 (exploring this thesis).
177. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 8-9. See generally ROSEMARY BLIESZNER &
REBECCA G. ADAMS, ADULT FRIENDSHIP (1992).
178. ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 152; see also id. at 152-53 (arguing that "space" for
sociability patterns friendship and is carved by socially constructed factors).
179. See Allan, supra note 61, at 72.
180. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 61, at 128-29.
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private sphere. Yet, one does not need elaborate citation to know that it is
heavily regulated by the state. Despite inhabiting the private sphere, the law
takes notice of the family, confers legal recognition upon it (marriage is a legal
union), and erects a series of duties and privileges that flow from familial status. 18
From this example, we might conclude that legal recognition hardly invades and
demeans the private sphere; rather, it can often help protect it from infringe-
ment. In any case, legal protection and recognition surely does not preclude true
friendship or love.'82 Arthur Stinchcombe summarized a similar objection to the
one I have outlined here as follows: "The notion is that the more formal, imper-
sonal, technical [and legal] social relations there are in a group, the less intimacy,
charity, and mutual faith there is likely to be." His response: "There is... not a
shred of evidence for this proposition, and a good deal of evidence against it."'83
Finally, as for the theory of friendship and economy Allan Silver and others
find in the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, Robert Lane offers reasons to
disagree. He forcefully argues that a modem commercial (and capitalist) society,
one insensitive to the role of the friend, will not ultimately promote personal
relations.'84 We are living in an age of decline for close friendships: We have
fewer intimate friends and weaker social ties more generally.' Lane believes that
the free market has a "destructive influence on friendship.., through elevating
instrumentalist and materialist values over social values, by eroding communities
and neighborhoods, and by intermittently increasing the demand for overtime
labor."'86 He finds some evidence that "markets, themselves, are an inherent
cause of social isolation," and that "the increased impersonality of shopping and
the increased use of individually, as contrasted to socially, consumed goods have
played modest roles in the loss of a therapeutic community of friends.' 8.. This
decline leads to a culture of depression, and market inefficiencies follow.'88
181. For a critique of some of the privileges family members get in the criminal law context,
see Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 6.
182. See BRAIN, supra note 13, at 89 ("As in marriage, which is also superficially a practical and
businesslike affair, the signing of a contract and the existence of sanctions do not preclude love.").
183. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONS 142, 185 names G. March ed., 1965).
184. Lane, supra note 126, at 533 (arguing that Silver's thesis-that commercial society
promotes personal relations-is "inoperative in modem societies").
185. See Portillo, supra note 134 ("Americans, who shocked pollsters in 1985 when they said
they had only three close friends, today say they have just two. And the number who say they've no
one to discuss important matters with has doubled to 1 in 4 .... ).
186. Lane, supra note 126, at 539 (identifying television-watching as a source of such degeneration).
187. Id. at 541-42.
188. Consider also Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 578-79:
Some theorists have even advanced a bold hypothesis of a specific historical causal relation-
ship between the fantasy world of political-legal ideological discourse about contracts and the
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One way to fix the decline might be for our legal system to find some way to
have our public sphere give friendship its due. This could lead to the repair of
both friendship networks and the economic networks that can be sustained by
them. Lane knows the agenda is a tall order: "[P]eople are chary of governmental
intrusion in their most private lives."' 9 But he has a strategy: "[Lest govern-
ments become invasive and paternalistic, the authorities.., have to focus on
creating a 'scaffolding' within which individuals [can] find new opportunities for
the companionship and ... solidarity that [could] genuinely increase their sense
of well-being."' 90 This project aims to begin the legal scaffolding of friendship
promotion and the well-being it generates.
2. Gender Dynamics in Friendship
Some may be opposed to the state's subsidization or endorsement of friend-
ship for the same reason some oppose the state's deference to and substantial
protection of the family: It is a potentially patriarchal and male-dominated
institution with a history of gender hierarchy.' 9 ' Many who have studied friend-
ship patterns confirm that men and women have different kinds of friendships,
9 2
and the friendship literature in many disciplines clearly use male friendship as a
model. 9 Some even go as far as suggesting (falsely, in my view) that "there is
social world of contracting: they contend that encouraging people to deal with one another as
strangers progressively erodes the underlying relations of solidarity, reciprocity and trust upon
which capitalist economies essentially depend.
If Gordon is right about this view (one he credits to the venerable economists Joseph Schumpeter and
Albert 0. Hirschman), there may be good economic grounds for developing a legal framework to
support friendships in society. See id. at 578 n.30.
189. Lane, supra note 126, at 544.
190. Id.
191. For one argument that the criminal law should be more suspicious of protecting the family
because of gender hierarchies that get reinforced in doing so, see Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 6.
192. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 40-42 (suggesting that women have less
time for friendship than men); id. at 67 (highlighting evidence that men have more friends and that
women have closer friends); id. at 69 (highlighting newer evidence that men and women have the
same number of friends, some evidence that women have more friends, and evidence that women
spend more time with their friends); id. at 72 (suggesting that men sometimes enforce distance in
friendships to project strength); id. at 73 (suggesting that male friendships are based more around
sociability than intimacy); ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 93 (claiming that women have face-
to-face friendships and men have side-by-side friendships); Oliker, supra note 32, at 19 (claiming that
men and women have very different friendship patterns); id. at 29 (claiming that women have
deeper friendships than men).
193. See ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 92 (claiming that friendship is gendered); id. at 65
(arguing that secondary names for friendship (buddy, pal, mate) are male-centered and all the great
friendships from literature are male-male); BRAIN, supra note 13, at 50-51 (discussing Montaigne,
the "arch-propagandist of male friendship," who "is emphatic about the impossibility of friendship
between men and women"); id. at 51 ("Friends are generally of the same sex." (quoting GEORGE
SANTAYANA, LITTLE ESSAYS (1920))); DERRIDA, supra note 1, at 278-79 (suggesting that the
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no cultural idea of friendship between women, and the cultural and social space
for women's friendships is limited."'94 Finally, it is not just high school students
who query whether guys and girls can be friends: Serious researchers of the social
phenomenon question the viability of cross-gender friendship'95 and investigate
which kinds of friendships serve as stronger social ties. It is a robust finding, in
any event, that friends tend to be of the same gender.'96
Perhaps it is hard, in practical terms, to see how the support of friendship
contributes to patriarchy. Even if friendship's history is one that is dominated by
male friendships, its benefits should accrue to all; and surely in the current age,
friendship is an equal-opportunity institution. However, there is at least one way
that it is imaginable for the state's endorsement or protection of friendship to
reinforce gender hierarchy: To the extent the friendship gives one access to infor-
mation, knowledge, networks, and clubs,'97 supporting friendship may contrib-
ute to helping men retain power over certain domains of society.
In the final analysis, I do not think this objection has power in condemning
the enterprise of getting our law and policies to take seriously the support, facili-
tation, and maintenance of friendship. Although it undoubtedly remains true
that many friendships occur within the same gender, that our cultural heritage
displays more prominent examples of male-male friendship, and that male friend-
ships are used to pass along "secret handshakes" to help other men maintain posi-
tions of power in our society, it is just as surely the case that the battle for gender
equality can be fought elsewhere. Any contribution of friendship to patriarchy
can be countered in other ways without needing to dispense with the protection
of the institution itself.'
98
"ethico-politico-philosophical discourses on friendship" have excluded friendships between women and
between men and women); PAHL, supra note 15, at 122-24 (discussing the purported "inferiority" of
female friendships and "the patriarchy's" role in promoting such a vision); Devere, supra note 73, at 153
(discussing Jacques Derrida's take).
194. O'Connor, supra note 61, at 118.
195. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 11 (specifically isolating cross-gender friendships
as "of special interest" because they "contravene the norm" of friends being social equals); id. at 82
(noting, in a bit of heterocentrism, that it is rare to have straightforward cross-gender friendships
without sexual interest because the "elements of sexuality often impinge on cross-gender sociability
at the outset"). The locus classicus here is, obviously, WHEN HARRY MET SALLY (Castle Rock
Entertainment 1989).
196. See ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 23 ("[Friends... tend to... be of the same
gender."); Adams, supra note 39, at 173 (identifying the finding that friends tend to share gender as
one of the most repeated findings in friendship literature).
197. See O'Connor, supra note 61, at 123.
198. Anyone who is reading my work carefully would probably realize that I am far less
sanguine about fighting for gender equality "elsewhere" when confronted with the special protection
the family receives in our criminal law. See Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 6 (arguing that the
family's historical role in contributing to the domination of women recommends against protecting
family privacy in the criminal justice context). Still, as I make clear there (with my coauthors),
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There are a few other things to say on the matter. First, there is very
recent evidence that suggests that women are closing the gap and have as
many non-kin confidants as men.' With friendship equality, women can simi-
larly help one another hold open the door of opportunity. Second, if the law
recognized the status of friend in the manner operationalized in Part 1, it could
contribute to the gender neutralization of friendship; nothing in the operation-
alized concept is gender specific (though I concede that its emphasis on equality
may give same-sex friendships an advantage). Finally, just as with the institu-
tions of family and marriage, keeping the law out of the private sphere may do
more to replicate patterns of domination within the institution;210 interposing
the law within friendship could further help break the cycle of male domina-
tion by disfavoring secret-handshake male friendships. Once the law adopts a
working conception of friendship, it can self-consciously exclude the sort of
friendships that do little else but serve the gender hierarchy. Refusing to allow
the law into the private sphere of marriage ultimately buttressed male domina-
tion; the law's interposition into marriage has helped to upset the gender hier-
201
archy promoted by keeping the private private.
there are other reasons that counsel against protection of the family in the criminal law context-and
the very reason the criminal law sought to protect families was, in many cases in the first instance, the
protection of the gender hierarchy. Here, the protection of friendship would be accomplished in spite of
an attenuated endorsement of gender hierarchy, not because of it.
199. See McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 362. Yet, sadly, "the equity is being achieved
by men's shrinking interconnection with non-kin confidants rather than by women's greater
connection to the world outside the family." Id.
200. For works on the theme of the law's carving out of the family and protecting male
domination, see generally ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL
POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 17-33 (1987);
Goodrich, Friends in High Places, supra note 18; Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321 (2003); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation
of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1835-39 (1985) (discussing the "legal tradition of
noninterference in the family"); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
201. Obviously, even marriage promotion itself contributes to gender inequality. Notably, as Laura
Rosenbury argues, friendship recognition and promotion could help undo the contribution marriage makes
to gender inequality. See generally Rosenbury, supra note 37. Rosenbury's work-although quite different
from mine--should help address the normative objection to my enterprise that emanates from the
perspective of gender.
Rosenbury does, however, advert to a different sort of challenge to my enterprise, a challenge I will
have to leave to queer theorists to validate and consider. She highlights that friendships in the gay
community may take on very different characteristics from friendships in the heterosexual community. See
id. at 10-11 (citing sources). Accordingly, it is plausible that my research agenda and the way I am carrying
it out may disadvantage friendships within the gay community. That is certainly not my intention-and
precisely by cordoning sex out of friendship, I am hopeful that sexual identity can be rendered irrelevant to
qualify for friendship protection. Yet, Rosenbury furnishes good reason to think the strict separation of sex
and friendship cannot work because the queer boundaries between friends and lovers are not distinct.
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3. Race, Class, and Friendship
It is not only that most friendships remain within one gender; rather, a
more general "homophily" pervades the social phenomenon. It is one of the
most robust findings in the sociological friendship literature that "friends
are normally of roughly the same age and class position. They also tend to share
similar domestic circumstances[,] to have similar ethnic backgrounds and, where
it is of social consequence, to belong to the same religion."20 2 Accordingly, friends
arguably further entrench differences of class, race, age, religion, and ethnicity.
Also, blacks are more likely than whites to have very few close friends and
confidants; thus, to the extent that the law gives any privileged status to
friendship, it may be preferring whites. 3 Although friends must be similar on
some important dimensions to sustain the friendship (as Part I suggests),"M their
socioeconomic and racial homophily might be of greater concern for a society
committed to full-scale integration and desegregation.
The differences in friendship patterns in different socioeconomic classes are
widely studied.0 ' Researchers study whether intimacy is the same among
working-class and middle-class people; whether only the middle and upper classes
have time for friends; whether "buddies" and "mates" are different forms of
friendship existing predominantly among the working class; and whether kin
plays a larger role in the lives of the working class." 6 There is at least some
Id. at 10 (citing Sasha Roseneil, Why We Should Care About Friends: An Argument for Queering the Care
Imarnary in Social Policy, 3 SOC. POL'Y & S(Xfy 409, 411 (2004)); see also SPENCER AND PAHL, supra note
15, at 85 (suggesting that among gay males there is no taboo about having sex with friends under certain
circumstances). If this is right, more care needs to be taken with operationalizing the concept of the friend
to ensure that it does not privilege heterosexuals.
202. ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 23; see also ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 91(noting that among the most replicated findings in friendship literature is that friends share gender, race,
and sociodemography); Adams, supra note 39, at 173 (same); McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 361(explaining that it is well known that social networks and friendships are homophilous) (citing Miller
McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 415 (2001)).
203. See McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 370; see also id. at 362 ("Both blacks and other-race
respondents have smaller networks of confidants than white Americans.").
204. See SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 205 ("However different they are, when they interact as friends,
they do so from a position of being alike. If they did not have this similarity, the friendship could not exist.").
205. See ALLAN, KINSHIP, supra note 15, at 90 (arguing that differences in friendship are especially
traceable to class differences); Allan, supra note 61, at 73 (describing class "as a crucial variable in
understanding patterns of sociability"); Yaojun Li et al., Social Change, Friendship, and Civic Participation,
8 SOC. RES. ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2003), http://www.socresonline.org.uk/8/4/li.html (reporting on recent
research on cross-class friendships).
206. See, e.g., ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 25 (discussing "buddies" and "mates" and their
role in the class structure); Allan, supra note 61, at 73 (noting that kin plays a bigger role in working-class
lives); id. at 75 (contrasting the friendship of the middle class and the "mateship" of the working class);
Oliker, supra note 32, at 31-33 (examining whether the working class has very different-and more
attenuated-friendships).
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consensus among those who study the sociology of friendship that the poor and
the working class are not able to form and maintain the same kinds of
friendships as the upper classes, at least in part because the members of these
social classes have less time for leisure and fewer resources for the gift giving
and entertaining that help sustain friendships."7 Moreover, certain friendship-
forming activities-such as clubs, gyms, team sports, neighborhood watch groups,
political party work, and parent-teacher associations2 0S-have lower participation
rates within the disadvantaged classes.2"
Is this an argument against the public recognition of friendship in our
law? Perhaps. If one is especially interested in dismantling our class-based and
racial hierarchies, it is plausible for one to resist giving friendship any special
privileges in the law on account of friendship's contribution to maintaining
and reproducing such hierarchies and social stratifications.20 As Mark Granovetter
urges, friendship's exclusive networks "may be one reason why poverty is self-
perpetuating",21'-and if you are committed to being against poverty, perhaps
you should be against friendship generally and against any public recognition
of the friend.
Moreover, beyond redistributive concerns, even if all one wants is an effi-
cient marketplace, homophily may cause market distortion. Enlightenment
thinkers, for example, attacked idealized notions of friendship "associated with
aristocratic milieux, because these inhibited the development of efficient
markets."'21 2 As with the concern about gender, "old-boys" networks may con-
tribute to the parceling of occupational and financial resources to those already
in an "in group" and the diverting of opportunities to friends when they could
be more efficiently allocated to others.
207. See PAHL, supra note 15, at 41.
208. See Feld & Carter, supra note 41, at 137.
209. See generally TONY BENNETT ET AL., ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES: AUSTRALIAN
EVERYDAY CULTURES (1999) (examining the activity preferences of different occupational classes in
Australia); Peter A. Hall, Social Capital in Britain, 29 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 417 (1999) (describing how
group membership affects the availability of social capital); Michael Johnston & Roger Jowell, How
Robust is British Civil Society?, in BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES, THE 18TH REPORT: PUBLIC POLICY,
SOCIAL TIES 175, 190-92 (Alison Park et al. eds., 2001) (reporting that the lower classes participate
with less frequency in certain social -capital-building groups).
210. See generally WENDY BOTTERO, STRATIFICATION: SOCIAL DIVISION AND INEQUALITY
(2005) (discussing homophily and its relationship to social stratification).
211. Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, in SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 201, 213 (Randall Collins ed., 1983) ("This pervasive use of strong ties by the poor and
insecure is a response to economic pressures . . . . [But] the heavy concentration of social energy in
strong ties has the impact of fragmenting communities of the poor into encapsulated networks with
poor connections between these units; individuals so encapsulated may then lose some of the
advantages associated with the outreach of weak ties.").
212. Silver, supra note 15, at 1485.
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Finally, the reality and robustness of homophily may expose friendship's
roots in narcissism and self-love. Since we tend to enjoy friendship only with
those similar to ourselves, one might think that friendship itself is an indulgent
institution where we get to lavish ourselves with self-love, projected through a
similar other. This idea is not unheard of in discussions about friendship"-and,
indeed, Aristotle himself found the relationship of friendship and self-love
noteworthy."4 If friendship is really about self-love, perhaps it is not sensible to
encourage narcissism through the legal promotion of the institution.
Ultimately, none of these objections is sufficient to deny legal protection to
the status of the friend. The reproduction of racial and class-based hierarchies is
undoubtedly a serious matter. But most people-irrespective of race or class-see
friendship as a central good, too important to be ignored completely on account
of a potential contribution to hierarchy or inefficiency. If friendship is
indispensable to our form of the good life, we ought to protect it and encourage
it, even if we are also simultaneously committed to combating hierarchies and
maintaining market efficiency. Indeed, to the extent that the law fails to
recognize friendships and continues to keep friendships immune from the law,
the law actually further entrenches stratification through friendship. If the law
got involved in friendship and recognized its role in our lives, the law could
actually do more to encourage cross-class and cross-race friendships."5 Although
I am not sure this is the wisest of ways to promote friendship (and, accordingly, I
do not address possible ways to do this in Part III), it assuredly could be done
somehow if this objection must be met in a more practical fashion. At the very
least, it bears noting that ignoring friendship does nothing to stop the
reproduction of hierarchies that friendships accomplish.
Homophily is analogous to a similar finding in marriage patterns: "homog-
amy." "Homogamy (marriage between individuals with similar social characteris-
tics) is frequent" and "extends well beyond class."2 '6 Indeed, "marriage and family
ties are more [homogamous] on class, religion, race, and several other social attrib-
utes" than friendship is homophilous.217 As Peter Blau and his colleagues
observe: "Disproportionate numbers of spouses are members of the same group or
stratum. Catholics tend to marry Catholics; whites, whites; persons of Greek
213. See, e.g., OUT.A, supra note 14, at 18-19 (discussing friendship as "self-love"); id. at 34-36
(considering whether friendship is such "nefarious self-love" that it is incompatible with "neighbor-
regard"); PAHL, supra note 15, at 78.
214. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 8,11. 1168b8-1169b2.
215. For example, one could imagine a legal regime that would dole out certain privileges to
friends who share core demographic differences. I do not condone this approach to friendship
regulation, but it could be done in certain contexts to meet the objection.
216. BOTTERO, supra note 210, at 167.
217. McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 359 (citing McPherson et al., supra note 202).
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descent, other Greek-Americans; and members of the upper-middle class, others
in the same class."21 Yet we do not use homogany as a reason to condemn or
ignore marriage and deny it legal privileges and duties-and homophily should
not be used as an excuse to ignore friendship. Of course, the law ought to do
what it can within its regulation of intimacy (whether of friendship or of
marriage) not to reproduce racial and class-based hierarchies; but these intimacies
are too important to be marginalized in service of diminishing the potentially
pernicious forms of balkanization that these "loves of similars" can engender
and sustain.
It is also relevant to note that the hold of homophily in the context of
friendship may not be iron clad. Although we are undoubtedly attracted to
friends who are similar to us (as measured by some important register), it may
be that homophily is merely a product of a failure of social mobility in times past.
Indeed, as higher education becomes more accessible to people regardless of class
or race, friendships may cease to display the characteristic of homophily; higher
education furnishes opportunities for class mixing and higher forms of friendship
irrespective of class and race.29 There is evidence that there are increases in the
number of people who have a confidant of another race.22 ' And whether the
growth of online friendships (where we can mask our own identity) contributes
to the loosening of homophily is another area for further study.2"
Finally, it is not clear what to make of the connection between homophily
and narcissism. Whether our potential narcissism is any business of the state is
contestable. And narcissism is at least as troublesome within marriage and
parenthood. Still, there may be a way to turn the narcissism objection on its
head. As John M. Cooper distills Aristotle's argument about friendship and
self-love, friendship facilitates self-love and inspires confidence; friendship is
218. Peter M. Blau et al., Intersecting Social Affiliations and Intermarriage, 62 Soc. FORCES 585,
600 (1984). The same homogamy is reported in more casual sexual relationships as well. See EDWARD
0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 268 (1994).
219. See McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 362 (arguing that more-highly educated people
have more to talk about, which, in turn, contributes to an increase in close friends); id. at 368 ("Net
of all other factors, increasing education sharply increases the number of discussion partners that a
respondent reports."); PAHL, supra note 15, at 117 (highlighting how higher education may loosen
the grip of homophily).
220. See McPherson et al., supra note 135, at 361 (claiming that racial diversity has
increased in discussion networks and in close ties).
221. There is some evidence that online friendships may be dissolving homophily's grip on
friendship, but it is too soon to say for certain. See BOASE ET AL., supra note 39. More, it remains
unclear the extent to which we can treat online friendships as "real" friendships. See generally
Mitchell Zuckoff, The Perfect Mark: How a Massachusetts Psychotherapist Fell for a Nigerian E-mail
Scam, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/
060515fa fact (detailing how easy it is to prey on the tropes of friendship and trust in order to
ensnare people in scams online). Further work in this area is certainly warranted.
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not ultimately about narcissism but helps us love and value ourselves.222 On this
view, homophily contributes to our own ability to value ourselves and is per-
haps yet another advantage friendship confers rather than a basis for objection to
its legal protection.
4. Subversive Friendships
Friends' special obligations to one another may undermine duties and
responsibilities that flow to co-citizens or to the state more generally-and this
may be reason for the state not to confer upon friends any special standing. The
subversiveness of friendship-to state, to morality, and even to epistemology-is
actually a recurring theme among those who think seriously about it. First,
consider C.S. Lewis:
It is... easy to see why Authority frowns on Friendship. Every real
Friendship is a sort of secession, even a rebellion.., unwelcome to top
people.... Each therefore is a pocket of potential resistance. Men who
have real Friends are less easy to manage or "get at"; harder for good
Authorities to correct or for bad Authorities to corrupt.... Friendship (as
the ancients saw) can be a school of virtue; but also (as they did not see) a
school of vice.... [Tihe element of secession, of indifference or deafness
(at least on some matters) to the voice of the outer world, is common to all
Friendships.... The danger is that this partial indifference or indifference
to outside opinion, justified and necessary though it is, may lead to a
wholesale indifference or deafness. 3
This account of the subversive nature of friendship is also echoed in more
contemporary authors."' The idea that the state might try to combat friendship
rather than support it seems to follow from this portraiture (though families may
be just as guilty as friends on this score).225
Lewis's notion has been given a more explicitly political valence by other
writers on friendship. For example, E. M. Forster famously said in the late 1930s,
"[I]f I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friends, I
hope I should have the guts to betray my country." '226 Montaigne also suggests
222. See Cooper, supra note 9, at 333.
223. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 94-95.
224. See PAHL, supra note 15, at 79, 153-54, 166.
225. The state's response to the subversiveness of the family, however, is solicitude. See generally
Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 6.
226. See, e.g., Lynn McFall, Integrity, 98 ETHICS 5, 12 n.17 (1987) (quoting E. M. Forster,
What I Believe (1939), reprinted in E. M. FORSTER, TWO CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 68 (1951));
EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 80; PAHL, supra note 15, at 41; SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 221. Forster's
original essay is available at http://www.geocities.com/dspichtinger/otexts/believe.html.
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that the obligations to true friends could dissolve all other obligations to the
city; 22 he writes of a paradigmatic friendship that the parties were "friends more
than citizens, friends more than friends or enemies of their country. '"1 21 This
theme is also prevalent in Allan Bloom's treatment of friendship: "[Friends] are
more dedicated to each other than to the polity, the goals of which they may not
share. ' 29 Bloom continues: "The pair of friends is a community of its own, which
may or may not be in accord with the body of citizens as a whole. Friendship
helps to explain what is wanted in politics but also leads to an awareness that
politics cannot arrive at that desired end.230 States may reject friends because
friends do not share their goals and because friends can expose the impoverished
nature of mere civic bonds.23 More concretely, "friendship frequently constitutes
the basis for the creation of underground organizations and antigovemmental
activities., 212  And friends, precisely owing to their high level of trust, are
candidates for the bonds that spur criminality.
23
Apart from challenges to the political establishment, friendship also poses
potential ethical problems. For example, "Christian theology has long been
concerned with the problem of 'preferential friendship'-friendship offered to
one or some but not others or to all-in light of the Christian obligation to love
,,211
all humanity. Indeed, Soren Kierkegaard thought that friendship can too easily
lead to despair and jealousy and threaten our moral lives consequently."3 Others
have suggested that friendship can lead to "aristocratic isolation,
' 2 6 
"elitism," 37
or "corporate superiority '26 that is incompatible with Christian commands.
227. See MONTAIGNE, supra note 1, at 142. It is worth noting, however, that Montaigne thought
that the inherent goodness of friends would keep them in check. Presumably, Aristotle and La Bodtie
also have this rejoinder since they insist that friends are always virtuous.
228. Id. at 140.
229. BLOOM, supra note 12, at 413.
230. Id. Recall that I am not committed to friendships always coming in pairs. See supra note 50.
231. 1 make this point in Leib, supra note 1, at 180-81.
232. VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE: CHANGING
VALUES IN POST-STALIN RUSSIA 172 (1989). As Pahl notes, in the fonrer Soviet Union, for example,
friendship was especially critical in helping people "beat[] the system." PAHL, supra note 15, at 154
(quoting SHLAPENTOKH, supra, at 174).
233. See SHLAPENTOKH, supra note 232, at 203-04 (discussing the role of close friendship ties
in crime and the mafia).
234. Silver, supra note 15, at 1488. The problem of friendship's preferential treatment in light
of the Bible's command of agape (in short, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," Matthew 22:39)
is discussed in OUTKA, supra note 14, at 281-85, and SULLIVAN, supra note 16, at 240-51.
235. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE 78 (Howard & Edna Hong trans., 1962).
Kierkegaard also takes issue with friendship because he thinks preferential love is reducible to self-
love. See id. at 65; OUTKA, supra note 14, at 18 & n. 19.
236. OUTKA, supra note 14, at 282-83 (citing PAULTILLICH, LOVE, POWER, ANDJUSTICE 119 (1954)).
237. Id. at 282.
238. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 99.
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As Epstein puts it, "The problem is that friendship is particular and exclusionary;
Christianity, in its intention at least, is universal and all embracing." '239
Although the state and our laws may not need to concern themselves with
the particulars of Christian ethics, a number of secular moralities are also chal-
lenged by friendship's partiality. Indeed, contemporary ethical theorists expend sub-
stantial energy trying to ascertain whether "associative duties"4°-special ethical
duties that flow to friends and seem to arise from the friendship relation-are
reconcilable with general ethical commands of equal treatment for all. As Niko
Kolodny puts the problem, the worry about "differential treatment"-that I
might give prior and more extensive treatment to my friends rather than to
strangers who may be in equal or greater need-stems from a concern about "dis-
tributional effects" that our associates will gain more than they deserve.24" '
The "problem of friendship" obtains especially, it seems, in ethical systems
that issue universalized commands that encompass the way we must act to all
others (or all other compatriots), 242 such as Kantianism,2 43 utilitarianism, conse-
quentialism, welfare liberalism, and other systems that demand forms of
impartiality.244  And even if friendship does not challenge the entirety of an
ethical system (because we have been able to construct successfully a system
that allows us to prefer our friends), friendship can lead us into what some
philosophers call "moral danger": By lying for friends, covering for them,
239. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 57; see also id. at 62.
240. "Associative duties" are at the center of much of Sam Scheffler's recent work. See
SCHEFFLER, supra note 21, at 4-5, 49-65, 67-70, 72-76, 78-79.
241. See Niko Kolodny, Do Associative Duties Matter?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 250, 250 (2002). The
"distributive objection" has been developed by Scheffler in Samuel Scheffler, The Conflict Between
Justice and Responsibility, in GLOBAL JUSTICE 86 (lan Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999).
242. For more on the special duties owed to compatriots, see Andrew Mason, Special
Obligations to Compatriots, 107 ETHICS 427 (1997), and Christopher Heath Wellman, Friends,
Compatriots and Special Political Obligations, 29 POL. THEORY 217 (2001).
243. Here I mean the political philosophy with roots in Immanuel Kant's work. Kant himself
had some rather unusual things to say about how friendship dovetailed with his own thinking in
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 261-64 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
244. For discussions of friendship that see it as an objection to theories that demand broad
impartiality, see JOLLIMORE, supra note 9, at 13 (focusing on friendship's challenge to consequentialism);
Cocking & Oakley, supra note 9 (same); Kapur, supra note 9 (same); Stroud, supra note 9, at 498 (noting
that many ethical philosophers are considering "friendship in connection with debates over partiality and
impartiality in ethics"); John Cottingham, Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality, 36 PHIL. Q. 357 (1986)
(focusing on the favoritism afforded friends, and the moral consequences that may flow therefrom); Baron,
supra note 9 (same); Susan Wolf, Morality and Partiality, 6 PHIL. PERSP. 243 (1992) (same). Some
consequentialists have developed rebuttals. See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY
367-68 (1989) (denying that love and friendship require favoritism); Kolodny, supra note 241, at
250-51 (arguing that associative duties are no problem, as long as there is also a global duty to take
care of others once you are done helping your associates).
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helping them escape capture by the authorities, or helping them violate sub-
stantial moral violations, we implicate ourselves in their misdeeds.24
Finally, some see friendship as a challenge not only to morality and the
demands of impartiality, but as a challenge to our reigning epistemologies that
require us to believe only that for which credible objective evidence can be
marshaled. Friendship causes biases in how we hear stories about our friends
and can threaten our epistemological system accordingly. 4
Such is the case for friendship's subversiveness from a variety of perspec-
tives. Although I certainly cannot undertake extended engagement with all of
the claims I articulate here, none firmly makes the case against promoting the
legal status of friend within the law.
In the first place, the authorities-threatened as they may feel by par-
ticular friendships-ultimately have the power of coercion. Any friendship that
leads to true rebellion can be stopped in its tracks; cells that are brewing serious
trouble can themselves be subverted through the mechanisms of the criminal
law. More importantly, it is the hallmark of a free society that members are
entitled to develop their capacities and identities with their intimates, so long
as no harm comes to others; 247 this may be at the core of our purported "freedom
of association," with roots in the First Amendment.248 Subversive to public
authority as friends have the capacity to become, they remain central elements
in a full and flourishing life (even if we occasionally tell little white lies and
help cover for friends who lie to their parents, for example). Refusing friends any
status in the law seems like a severe response to an attenuated possibility of
threat to state and society. Friends who are friends to commit crimes and wreak
havoc need not be respected in their status; a wholesale legal ban on recognizing
friendship seems like an overinclusive and draconian response to a very low-
level threat that can be managed with other techniques.244
245. See Cocking & Kennett, supra note 105 (focusing on the moral dangers presented by loyalty
to friends who ask us to violate moral commands); id. at 287 (suggesting that one can be a good friend
by lying to others). It is worth noting here that family members are exempted from prosecution for
harboring fugitive family members in fourteen states; friends never get this benefit. I discuss and cite
these exemptions (with my coauthors) in Markel, Collins & Leib, supra note 6.
246. See Keller, supra note 9 (addressing the challenge of friendship to epistemological
partiality); Stroud, supra note 9 (same).
247. See SHLAPENTOKH, supra note 232, at 172 (Soviet totalitarianism had an "ideological
opposition to friendship.... The leadership in [totalitarian] societies prefers to have an individual
completely isolated from other people and thus more at the mercy of the authorities.").
248. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
249. Indeed, the prevalence of these kinds of friendships may help tIs with the second-generation
questions about what sorts of legal protections for friends are appropriate. If the law discovers too many
friends that are co-conspirators, that will have effects on how the law treats friends in certain areas of
the criminal law-but it is no argument that the law should ignore friendship entirely.
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Indeed, friendship is important to develop precisely because it furnishes
freedom from the state. The citizens of the. Soviet Union were said to treat
friendships as precious in large measure because they helped develop personal
integrity and dignity when the state otherwise could not.25 A free society like
ours should welcome the dignity that can be conferred through friendship, not
fear it. As Lewis understood well: "[If our masters... ever succeed in producing
a world where all are [clompanions and none are [flriends, they will have
removed certain dangers, [but] will also have taken from us what is almost our
strongest safeguard against complete servitude." '' And as Jason Scorza recently
argued, "mhe proliferation of personal friendships... serves as an independent
check on the possible civic corruption of the state as a whole."2"2 Of course, there
is always the danger that friends in high places will only help one another
out-and nepotism and favoritism still need policing-but this is simply another
area where friendship potentially needs to be regulated, not ignored.
To the extent that the bonds of friendship will expose civic bonds to be
thin, it can hardly be the place of a free society to ban friendship to reinforce
patriotism. Such bans are the sort of actions undertaken by totalitarian socie-
ties. The ties modern liberal states create and need for regime maintenance need
not be especially strong or tight to perform their functions. No one seriously
considers policies and laws that would aggressively subvert familial ties for the
potential role the family plays in exposing mere civic ties to be weak. Neither
should we consider having the law undermine the importance of friendship to
prop up the co-citizen relationship.
It does not seem especially pressing to worry about Christian ethics and
whether our public policies and public laws are consistent with Christian com-
mands. And this is probably not the best venue to try to tackle the interesting
ethical challenges philosophers have developed. Still, as Peter Railton argues:
[WIe must recognize that... friendships... are among the most important
contributors to whatever it is that makes life worthwhile; any moral theory
deserving serious consideration must itself give them serious considera-
tion.... If we were to find that adopting a particular morality led to irrec-
oncilable conflict with central types of human well being.., then this
surely would give us good reason to doubt its claims.2 3
250. See PAHL, supra note 15, at 153-54 (drawing from SHLAPENTOKH, supra note 232, 170-77).
251. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 94.
252. Scorza, supra note 11, at 89 (citing PAUL J. WADDELL, FRIENDSHIP AND THE MORAL LIFE 49,
61-68 (1989)).
253. Peter Railton, Alenation, Consequenziaism, and the Demands of Mora/ity, in
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITcS 93,98-99 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988). Railton seeks to preserve
a consequentialist ethical theory even though consequentialism is the theory most susceptible to the
challenge from friendship. For an argument that Railton's effort ultimately fails, see Wilcox, supra note 9.
678
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This general theme is consistent among the philosophers who see friend-
ship as a challenge to this or that ethical theory: The partiality of friendship may
be problematic if it bleeds into territories where we have a strong requirement of
impartiality. It is likely the case that we have no thoroughgoing requirement to
be impartial all the time in every context. To be sure, we must be careful not to
let the partiality of friendship overwhelm our general duties, but the idea that the
friend is not a morally relevant category itself may be seriously misguided." 4 We
can say with certainty that we should not allow a judge to prefer (or even sit in
judgment over) her friends because there is, in the judicial context, an especially
stringent duty of impartiality. We can also say with certainty that corporate
boards of directors charged with protecting shareholder interests should not use
corporate assets to benefit directors' friends. Even a law committed to encour-
aging friendship could not admit or tolerate such forms of improper partiality.5'
But the idea that I have to share my licorice with everyone impartially borders
on the laughable; preferential treatment for my friends in licorice distribution is
not morally problematic. Again here, a sophisticated regulation of friendship can
help distinguish when friendship is problematic to the state's core and appropri-
ate commitments, and when it is not.
In any case, for the most part, philosophers do not present friendship as a
challenge to morality to argue in earnest that we ought not to have friends.
Rather, through inquiring about friendship's relationship to morality, they aim to
refine our understanding of what makes an ethical system plausible and to refine
conceptions of ideal friendship. Same with Simon Keller's and Sarah Stroud's
254. This theme is nicely developed with sophistication in Baron, supra note 9.
255. Yet, even the latter limitation of friendship promotion requires a clearer law of friendship.
Take, for example, the recent Martha Stewart cases. In Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004),
Delaware's high court announced that friendship "may influence the demand futility inquiry." Id. at
1050. In short, in a derivative action, shareholders that wish to sue members of their boards of directors
must present a demand upon directors as a prerequisite to litigation. The demand requirement,
however, is not necessary if the board members can be shown to lack "independence," for the demand
would be "futile." As Beam holds, although independence will be presumed, "to render a director
unable to consider demand, a relationship must be of a bias producing nature." Id. Although the
court held that the friendships between Martha Stewart and her colleagues on the board of directors
at Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia did not rise to this level, the court left open the possibility that
certain friendships--if properly pleaded and described in detail-could be "[ ]sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt about a director's independence." Id. No further standards about the sort of
friendships that might establish demand futility have been forthcoming, but this is yet another fertile
area for investigation into how the law regulates and renders relevant the friendships in our lives.
Needless to say, without any standards, courts have not been especially solicitous of shareholders
who try to use friendships to prove demand futility. See, e.g., Caviness v. Evans, 229 F.R.D. 354 (D.
Mass. 2005); Fagin v. Gilmartin, No. 03-2631, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28916 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2004);
Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2006); Benihana of
Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150 (Del. Ch. 2005).
Thanks to Matt Bodie and Arthur Pinto for discussion on these points.
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recent challenges to reigning theories of epistemology from the perspective of
friendship's "epistemic partiality": The idea is not to condemn friendship but to
refine our epistemology. Accordingly, we should not utilize these potential "short-
comings" of friendship to argue against having friends and having the state sup-
port and facilitate those relationships central to our lives. Indeed, ignoring them
completely is a sure way to trigger high legal-compliance costs and to maintain a
polity with little affective resonance among citizens."6
In any case, whatever moral challenges friendship presents, the state's
commitment to equal regard could be manifested in multiple ways (and ways that
still protect friendships). There is much more the state could be doing to bring
about the equal regard of all citizens, and friendship's distributional effects must
be seen as a relatively minor contribution to social and economic inequality.
Families undoubtedly also challenge the moral command of equal regard, and
they also potentially contribute to economic inequality through inheritance laws.
Yet the law clearly confers the family with the respect of status,57 and friends
potentially deserve similar respect.
5. Why Focus on Friendship's Failure?
As a final effort to explore why reasonable people may oppose having our
law recognize the status of friend, I have to assume certain facts not in evidence,
as it were. It is all well and good to consider at a very high level of abstraction
whether the law should "recognize," "respect," "support," "facilitate," or "pro-
mote" the status of the friend as I have done thus far, but it is hard to know quite
what that might mean without Part III to come, which will introduce more spe-
cific ways the law could take notice of friendship. Nevertheless, here I am trying
to understand core objections that arise before embarking on that more nuanced
effort to put flesh on the idea of what a law that recognizes friendship would
look like.
In that preliminary spirit, this objection is, in a sense, a variant of the first
because it centers on friendship's voluntary nature. One might argue that one
simply does not need the law to protect friendship because true friends
protect themselves. The law would seemingly step in only when a friendship
256. See Pitman B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to Co plemenrtrarity,
in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
GUANXi 179 (Thomas Gold et al. eds., 2002) (detailing how China's legal system must take account of
informal social networks to maintain compliance and affective resonance); Kahan, supra note 150, at 369.
257. It does this in the context of default rules for wills and support requirements, for example: "[I]f a
man dies intestate, his assets would go not to the dear friend or friends who may have taken good care of
him for years right up to the end, but instead quite possibly to a distant relative whom the deceased may
never have met." EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 64. And, of course, we cannot wholly disinherit our spouses.
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has dissolved or when there was no friendship worth respect in the first place."'
In such cases, it would be hard to justify enforcing friendship's norms upon
parties who do not want to be bound by them; as many suggest, the norms of
friendship are often defined in contradistinction to nonvoluntary norms that
the law imposes. If friendship is to retain what is most special about its internal
norm structure, it cannot be imposed upon nonconsenting parties.
There are a few things to be said in response. First, one need not see the
law as a mere tool to repair broken relationships. Perhaps the legal regimes of
contracts, torts, and property-when looked at wholly ex post-present to us
this way. But if viewed through their capacity to incentivize behavior in the
future-traditionally understood as ex ante reasoning-there is much the law
can do to support and facilitate friendship through the adjudication and
administration of cases between litigants who have previously been friends. We
can and should protect the invocation of friendship and the trust it entails so that
people who try to trade or prey on the trope in the future will be deterred. More-
over, as Aristotle understood, dissolved friendships still ought to (and did, accord-
ing to him) get some special treatment on account of friendship past. 59  It is
natural to think that the category of "ex-friend" also carries with it a status wor-
thy of recognition and may be relevant to ascertaining appropriate legal remedies
as well.
260
That the law is not a mere tool of repair also coheres with a certain perspec-
tive on friendship that is rooted in Jacques Derrida's work: Perhaps one can
declare a friendship to be real only upon death. As Goodrich (deeply indebted to
Derrida) puts it, "[A] friend is only irrefragably a friend once dead and hence
incapable of betraying intimacies or changing character or opinion. '26' Goodrich
258. Of course, some might argue that if parties try to resolve their disputes through litigation,
that fact alone is evidence that the parties were never friends in the first place. To be sure, one of the
affirmative arguments for supporting friendship is the resources it provides in averting litigation. See
Potter, supra note 256, at 184 (arguing that informal social networks help resolve disputes, averting
fomal legal action). Nevertheless, any skim of the state and federal reporters should make it clear that ex-
friends often end up in court; indeed, the dispute can be aggravated by friendship precisely because
friends expect more of one another and feel more betrayed by not being able to reach amicable agreements
outside the legal system. I perform such a survey infra Part Ill and find many cases where friends (or
ex-friends) end up in court.
259. ARISTOTLE, supra note 38, at bk. ix, ch. 4, 11. 1165b35-b37.
260. The fact that many friendships dwindle is well known, and it is not necessarily the symptom of
a flawed friendship. People move away, get married, have kids, get rich, become poor, change jobs, change
interests--and all of these circumstantial changes can affect our friendship networks. See ALLAN,
KINSHIP, suproa note 15, at 95.
261. Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note 18, at 222; see also id. ("Derrida affirms at the end
of his treatise that 'friendship could not have been declared during the lifetime of the friend ... It is
thanks to death that friendship can be declared. Never before, never otherwise." (quoting DERRIDA,
supra note 1, at 302)).
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suggests that the conclusion that "present friendship is always failing, imperfect,
and unsaid" leads to the law's "non-exposure" and nonendorsement of friend-
ship.162 Yet, one can see this feature of friendship as recommending a different
approach: Friendship's incompleteness is one reason why the law can and should
intervene. Rather than seeing the law as interposing in a broken friendship that
was, the law can treat parties as incomplete friends in the process of becoming.
Thus, unlike the posture that the law takes in divorce-a place where the law
clearly steps in only upon rupture-within friendship, reconciliation could be a
presumptive goal.
Finally-and more concretely and practically-the law can do its work out-
side the context of case adjudication altogether. There are many ways that a
policy program of supporting friendship could operate: We could offer tax breaks
or deductions for "friendship expenditures"; we could allow "loss of society" dam-
ages to friends of those who die from tortious conduct;263 we could establish a
"Friends Medical Leave Act" to allow friends to leave work to take care of one
another during sickness;"' we could allow friends to sue on one another's behalf
and furnish them with standing; we could give prisoners rights to see their friends
(as we do);265 we could presume to give friends the legal right to make medical
decisions on our behalf (without a contract giving them that right);266 and we
262. Id. at 226.
263. The Beyond Conjugality report recommends this approach to respecting nonconjugal friend-
ships. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 34, at 37-40.
264. The same report recommends this option as well. See id. at 40.
265. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Inmate Discipline and Special Housing
Units, Program Statement 5270.07, § 541.12(5) (Dec. 29, 1987) ("[Inmates] have the right to visit and
correspond with family members, and friends.").
266. Florida, for example, furnishes the "close personal friend" with standing to make end-of-life
decisions. In the absence of an advance directive, end-of-life health care decisions may be made by a
close friend-although priority of the friend's wishes is subordinated to the preferences of a judicially
appointed guardian, a spouse, an adult child, a parent, a sibling, and close relatives. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 76 5.40 1(1)(a)-(g) (West 2005). Practically, a friend will almost never get the right to make a
decision given the low priority friendship receives by statute. But, at least in theory, all the friend would
need to do is meet the statutory definition of "close personal friend":
"Close personal friend" means any person 18 years of age or older who has exhibited special
care and concern for the patient, and who presents an affidavit to the health care facility or to
the attending or treating physician stating that he or she is a friend of the patient; is willing
and able to become involved in the patient's health care; and has maintained such regular
contact with the patient so as to be familiar with the patient's activities, health, and religious
or moral beliefs.
Id. § 765.101(3). And you thought the friend couldn't be defined by the law!
New York has adopted a very similar approach to Florida's. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2961(5)(McKinney 2002) (defining "close friend"); id. § 2965 (2)(a)(i)-(vi) (prioritizing potential surrogates
if no specified surrogate decisionmaker is available, with the friend having the lowest priority). And
many states, of course, allow citizens to appoint a surrogate of their choosing (whether a family
member or a friend) to make medical decisions in case of incapacity. See generally ABA Comm'n on
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could establish legal rituals to solidify friendships just as we solemnize the status of
marriage and citizenship-our other associative duties-through public oaths
and legal documents."' However we judge the merits of these particular ideas (and
Legal Problems of the Elderly, Citations of State Health Care Decisions Legislation, BIOETHICS BULL.,
Winter/Spring 1997, at 23 (listing living will and healthcare power of attorney statutes).
I thank Mary Coombs for drawing my attention to Florida's interesting effort to give the friend
statutory recognition and definition.
267. The ritualization and institutionalization of friendship is something considered by ALLAN,
FRIENDSHIP, supra note 15, at 4 ("There are no rituals associated with [friendshipl nor any specifically
public affirmation of the solidarity that exists between those who are friends."), and BRAIN, supra
note 13, at 75 ("Unlike most societies, we have no means of embellishing friendship with ritual or pact,
and except in the children's playground it is not even allowed an exchange of vows."). Brain, in particular,
urges more ceremony surrounding friendships. See id. at 106-07.
Such ceremonies could have a potentially salutary effect on the law's trying to perform the difficult
task of assessing who counts as a friend. For example, there is a German custom-Briderschaft trinken
(literally, "to drink brotherhood")-in which two male friends decide to use a more informal mode of
addressing each other, going from the Sie-Sie or the Sie-Du relationship (fornil) to the Du-Du (informal).
They self-consciously share a drink while bringing each other close (often, interlocking arms) to
signify the change in the moxe of address. This ceremony could help to signal to the law that parties, in
fact, consider one another friends. Although this tradition was once reserved for men, the contemporary
instantiation of the practice seems to include women as well.
For more on this very interesting friendship ceremony (that seemingly aims to make friendship ties
more like a kinship tie ("brotherhood")), see Email from Markus Dubber to Ethan J. Leib (Jan. 13, 2005)
(on file with author), and Email from Christopher C. King to Ethan J. Leib (July 12, 2006) (on file with
author) (suggesting that the ceremony may have some "evidentiary importance in labor law"). Little has
been written in English about the ceremony, though it is mentioned in Florian Znaniecki, The Dynamics
of Social Relations, 17 SOCIOMETRY 299, 301 (1954), and appears in LEON URIS, EXODUS (1958), and
PATTON (20th Century Fox 1970). Thanks to Jeff Lipshaw for the leads on sources in American
popular culture. Of course, "elevating" friendship to brotherhoods and sisterhoods is the stuff of, inter
alia, college fraternities and sororities.
David Chambers has proposed that certain kinds of friends be allowed to register with the
govermment as "designated friends." Here is how he describes his proposal:
IC]ouples would come to a government office and register as "designated friends." The form
for registering would tell them that by doing so they are accepting a set of mutual
responsibilities. They are empowered to make and undertake the obligation to make financial
and medical decisions on behalf of the other in case the other becomes incapacitated; they are
entitled to family leave, or the same terms as married persons to take care of the other if the
other becomes seriously ill; they are entitled to the same testimonial privileges as spouses in
civil and criminal cases if they enter the designated friend relationship at least two years prior
to the event giving rise to the case; if the other dies without a will, they are entitled to some
specified modest share of his or her estate; and, finally, if they are government employees, they
will be subject to anti-nepotism rules that apply to employees who are married to each other.
Chambers, supra note 34, at 1353. The idea draws from "reciprocal-beneficiary" statutes in effect in
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572c-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005), and Vernont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1301-1306 (2002).
Although Chambers offers a very interesting way to codify friendship, 1 have a few hesitations
about endorsing Chambers's designated friends status. First, Chambers's proposal is fundamentally
a marriage substitute. Indeed, Rosenbury calls Chambers's idea "marriage-lite." Rosenbury, supra
note 37, at 18. And although designated friend is a status available to platonic friends, Chambers
includes among the eligible parties lovers and family members. Accordingly, his working definition
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my plan is not to defend these ideas at length here), none depends on enforcing
friendship upon parties who do not wish to be friends. Rather, they are ways our
public policies could further support and recognize a legal status for the friend.
This discussion provides a nice segue to Part III, which briefly surveys
some ways this research agenda can help us see where the law does and where
it can support friendship. This Article ultimately leaves to future work second-
generation inquiries about where, in particular, it would be best to operationalize
a law of friendship.
1II. WHERE DOES AND WHERE SHOULD FRIENDSHIP MATTER?
The ambition of this Article is to commence a research agenda that both
develops the normative case for having the law confer upon friendship special
status and embarks upon an empirical and doctrinal inquiry into how the law
can and does perform such a task. Now that Part II has offered arguments for
why the agenda is important, Part III surveys various areas within the law in
which courts have found or could find the subject of friendship relevant for
legal analysis. There is nothing systematic or exhaustive about the domains of
the law investigated here; they are merely meant to provoke discussion and lay
a foundation for further work in developing a law of friendship. To the extent
that they can be organized thematically, they divide into two classes of ways the
law could take account of friendship: first, by exacting special duties upon
friends (the duties of rescue, disclosure and fair dealing, and confidentiality);
and, second, by furnishing friends with certain privileges (the privileges of
informality, giving care, privacy, and vindicating rights). Although this Part
tends to focus on ways courts and judges can do and treat the subject matter,
of the friend is too broad, and functionally treads on the regulation of sex and the family sufficient
to render his proposal very unlikely to garner substantial support.
Second, designated friends are products of contract, not more organic social relations. Although one
could reasonably attempt to limit the duties and privileges of friendship only to those who enter "friendship
contracts," I concede that I remain leery of forcing friends to appeal to the state in advance to receive
legal recognition. The law should come to friends, not force friends to sign up with the state. As Ira
ElIman writes (focusing on friends who cohabitate), "The problem with the contract [idea] is that it does
not acknowledge that duties can arise from relationships themselves apart from an exchange of promises
that constitutes a contract." Ira Ellman, Why Making Family Law Is Hard, 35 Apz. ST. L.J. 699, 711
(2003). That said, Chambers's approach at least answers the challenge of how we will identify who shall
count as a friend.
Finally, with Rosenbury, supra note 37, at 18, 1 think the proposal for designated friends status
too neatly supports "coupledom." Stable couples are privileged in Chambers's scheme, and friends do
not need to embody such stability. More, even if friendship is predominately dyadic, see supra note
50, surely we can have multiple friends, something Chambers's proposal limits.
Thanks to Leslie Harris for discussion on Chambers's article. For further discussion of
"contractarianism" in the duties and privileges of friendship, see infra note 423.
684 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 631 (2007)
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 684 2006-2007
the public policy arguments favoring the law's support for friendship need not
focus only on the judiciary. Legislators also should take notice and move the
law toward a greater protection of the status of the friend.
A. The Duties of Friendship?
1. The Duty to Rescue
As everyone who has gone to law school in this country knows, Americans
do not have a general duty to rescue strangers. 9 This fact has been a matter of
debate among scholars26 and legislators,"' some of whom reject the rule and aim
to create a more general duty of helping our fellow citizens avoid trouble. To be
sure, there are a number of exceptions to the rule, most of which draw upon some
status of one of the parties: A special duty tends to emanate from a special
relationship."' Special relationships could include that of employer-employee,
school-student, and business-customer, but the list is open ended.
272 It is plausible
to imagine that a duty to rescue friends could and should be recognized by the
law. This may, of course, be one of the areas where legal protection is least
needed-after all, it is a pitiful friend that would not undertake a rescue. But for
just that reason there would be little cost to recognizing such a duty in law.
The case most on point-and one where such a duty was arguably rec-
ognized-is FarweU v. Keaton."' In this case, a defendant watched his friend
268. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) ("As a rule, one has no duty
[under tort law] to come to the aid of another."); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 18.6 (2d ed. 1986); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (4th ed. 2003).
269. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980); A. D.
Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 321-25 (1965). This literature is too large to cite with
any completeness here.
270. See David C. Biggs, "The Good Samaritan Is Packing": An Overview of the Broadened Duty
to Aid Your Fellowman, With the Modern Desire to Possess Concealed Weapons, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 225, 229-36 (1997) (surveying "Good Samaritan" statutes that create a duty to rescue); Lon
T. McClintock, Note, Duty to Aid the Endangered Act: The Impact and Potential of the Vermont
Approach, 7 VT. L. REV. 143 (1982) (summarizing "Good Samaritan" provisions).
271. An example is the Tarasoff rule, where a psychiatrist is deemed to have a duty to warn her
patient's threatened victim that the patient intends to exact violence upon him. See Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). More generally, invitees and licensees get special
protection. See 1 WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 3:4.4 (2d ed.
2005) (specifying exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule). There is also an exception for when a plaintiff
is brought by a defendant into a false sense of dependency on some action purportedly taken by the
defendant to protect the plaintiff. See Johnson v. Souza, 176 A.2d 797 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1961) (host liable to guest for injury on icy steps because of assurances that steps would be salted).
Even here the status of host may be doing much of the work to get the defendant on the hook.
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A-314B.
273. 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
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undergo a beating, resulting in substantial head injuries."' He then drove his
friend around for a few hours and noticed that the friend passed out in the back
of his car.75 Ultimately, the defendant parked the car in the driveway of his
friend's grandparents' house and left him there after failing to awaken him.276
The friend died as a result of his injuries and as a result of failing to get medical
attention on time. 7 The friend's estate sued for wrongful death and the court
upheld a jury verdict against the defendant.278
The court made it clear that a variety of factors were relevant in reaching
its conclusion and did not make explicit that its judgment was based on the
duties of friendship in particular (although the friendship is mentioned more
than once). 279 The parties were, the court says, "companions" on a "social ven-
ture."'28 Indeed, the court aims to reason by analogy and fit the social relationship
between the parties into an already-recognized "special-relationship" exception.28" '
Other courts, such as the one in Webstad v. Stortini,282 limit the Farwell case
to its facts-highlighting both the fact that the plaintiff was an invitee in the
defendant's car (because the status of invitee rather than friend tends to trigger
special duties of rescue upon hosts) and the fact that the defendant's leaving his
friend in his car disabled the friend from getting the help he otherwise might
have gotten elsewhere (another traditional factor in duty-to-rescue cases that
tends to trigger liability).283
Notwithstanding the limited holding of Farwell (as further circumscribed by
Webstad), if the arguments in Part II were persuasive, one could recommend that
more courts adopt the approach of the Farwell court and be clear that we
have a duty to rescue our close friends."M Perhaps we do not need the law to tell
us to save our friends. But why shouldn't the law confirm what we already know
to be true? It is perfectly sensible for the law to reinforce our well-accepted
duties; it contributes to the law's affective resonance, and may have broader
effects in facilitating compliance with the law's commands more generally.
274. Id. at 219.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 222.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 924 P.2d 940 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
283. Id. at 947-48.
284. One would think this would be a relatively easy sell. But we have no duty to rescue our
family members. See, e.g., Bell & Hudson, P.C. v. Buhl Realty Co., 462 N.W.2d 851, 853-54 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990) (finding that no "special relationship" exists between brothers). I am not holding my
breath on this one.
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2. The Duty to Disclose and Deal Fairly
In fraud cases, courts will not impose a general duty to disclose or deal
fairly upon anyone but fiduciaries or those in relationships of trust or confi-
dence .2" Although some courts would never treat friendship as capable of
triggering such fiduciary duties, other courts take a different approach. This is
a fertile area for further investigation and exploration, and I aim here merely
to scratch the surface and show how courts sometimes find themselves entan-
gled in friendships and could, perhaps, benefit from a more systematic
approach to them. But the recommendation here is consistent with the
general theme of this Article: Courts should treat good friends as fiduciaries,
and use the definition of friendship in Part I to assess whether a true friend-
ship exists.
Wilson v. Zorb286 is the classic treatment of friendship and fraud, where
friendship is held not to trigger fiduciary duties. The factual background is as
follows: The plaintiff and defendant, both doctors, "had been close friends for
many years, intimately associated in social activities. 2 7 They spent much time
together (with their wives) and stayed at each other's homes often. '2" Then
the defendant negligently shot the plaintiff.29 After several weeks in the
hospital, the plaintiff recovered in defendant's home over a number of
months. 29" The defendant gave the plaintiff a payment as further compensa-
tion and got the plaintiff to sign a release of all claims stemming from the
shooting.'9' Ultimately, the plaintiff sued because he claimed he was induced
to sign the release based on alleged false assertions that the defendant made
about his financial situation.292 At issue in the case was whether the friendship
constituted a fiduciary relationship, which would have triggered special
disclosure duties from the defendant to the plaintiff. Here is what the court
had to say:
Warm friendship, confidence and an affectionate regard for each other
were mutual with the parties, and yet each was self-sufficient, competent
and independent. At times each attended and prescribed for the other's
patients and they consulted with each other in professional matters.
Such relationships happily are common, but they are not confidential
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1965).
286. 59 P.2d 593 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
287. Id. at 594.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 594-95.
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relationships in a legal sense. It takes something more than friendship or
confidence in the professional skill and in the integrity and truthfulness
of another to establish a fiduciary relationship. 93
In the final analysis, little turned on these pronouncements in Wilson
because the court found no evidence of misstatements of material facts by the
defendant, and the defendant voluntarily disclosed his financial situation in any
event.294 But one can infer from the court's opinion that the duties of fidu-
ciaries-including the duties of disclosure and fair dealing-will not apply to
friends on account of a friendship.295
This approach was endorsed more recently in Kudokas v. Balkus,296 a fraud
case in which the court refused to find a duty to disclose despite a life-long
friendship between the buyer and seller of a motel. The court did not deny that
close ties of friendship might be found within certain "confidential relationships"
in which a duty to disclose would be required of a seller. But it was careful to
indicate that friendships do not create confidential or fiduciary relationships that
trigger duties to disclose and deal fairly. 97
A similar conclusion was reached in Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 9 where the
court refused to find a fiduciary relationship between two friends without a
showing that one of the friends dominated or exerted influence over the other.
The plaintiff was a foreign artist who entered into an employment contract with
a defendant corporation, which published magazines and calendars.2" The presi-
dent of the corporation was a close personal friend of the plaintiff and his wife,
and the plaintiff claimed not to be aware of the compensation terms in the
agreement.3" The plaintiff claimed that his friend unfairly and fraudulently
induced him to sign the contract."' At issue was whether the friendship between
the parties triggered any special duties by the defendant."2 The court concluded
that it did not.303 In particular, notwithstanding the trust between the two men,
no "confidence had been reposed in [the defendantj" and the defendant had not
"dominated or influenced" the plaintiff.3"
293. Id. at 596.
294. Id. at 597.
295. Cf. Bush v. Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885, 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Bissett, J., dissenting)
("Friendship alone does not establish a fiduciary relationship ... .
296. 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
297. Id. at 321-22.
298. 166 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cit. 1948).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 652.
302. Id. at 652-53.
303. Id. at 653.
304. Id. at 655.
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Not all courts, however, have reached such conclusions. An early California
case, for example, held that "[fliduciary relations are not found solely in those
legal relationships, such as guardian and ward, husband and wife, trustee and
beneficiary, but are also found where in fact the relation of trust and confidence
exists between trusting friends." ' And a case from Washington in 1912 contains
this rumination about friendship and its role in deciding cases about the duties of
disclosure and fair dealing:
A point is made that Mr. Gray was a shrewd and successful business man
and ought not to have been misled by promises that, when revealed in the
courtroom, seem to be unreasonable. But in this appellants have over-
looked an element which disarms caution; that is, friendship.... The
impulse that leads men to trust those in whom they have confidence
cannot be ignored by the courts.... Hence, when men deal as friends and
the one accepts that as true which, but for the element of friendship,
would put a man upon inquiry, the law will protect him in his trust as cer-
tainly as it will deny him relief if the personal relations of the parties are
such that the dealing is at arm's length. Although everything that would
tend to show fraud in law is denied or qualified by explanation, we have
here two men; the one an experienced mining man whose connection
with a mine of sensational history had made him the envy of all who had
not touched hands with luck, the other, shrewd and successful in the
unemotional pursuit of trade, but utterly ignorant of mines and min-
ing.... To say that a man who is moved to part with his money under
such circumstances is to be held at arm's length is to deny sustenance to
the very root of society; to make friendship a liability instead of an asset."0 6
In this case, Mr. Gray's friend was held to have special duties of disclosure
and fair treatment to his business partner, who was a close friend that used his
friendship for personal gain. Perhaps here it is hard to say that the defendant was
a "real" friend. Still, he traded on the currency of the concept and can be held to
the special duties real friendships can impose.
Indeed, many courts have held that friendship may be a relevant factor
in establishing a party's right to rely on representations. 0 7 And an underlying
305. Thompson v. Thompson, 267 P. 375, 380 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928); see also Palladine v.
Imperial Valley Farm Land Ass'n, 225 P. 291, 299 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (recognizing the role of
friendship in trust, and giving friendship legal effect).
Just to make it clear: The California cases are all over the place. Wilson, Kudokas, Thompson,
and Palladine are all from California and reach different conclusions on the subject.
306. Gray v. Reeves, 125 P. 162, 163 (Wash. 1912).
307. See Spiess v. Brandt, 41 N.W.2d 561, 566-67 (Minn. 1950) (finding that friendship can
establish a party's right to rely on her friend); Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Luckey Platt Ctr. Assocs., 245
A.D.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (same); Callahan v. Callahan, 514 N.Y.S.2d 819, 822 (App. Div.
1987) (same); Liebergesell v. Evans, 613 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Wash. 1980) (same); Graff v. Geisel, 234
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friendship between contracting parties may excuse a party from carefully inves-
tigating form contracts for exculpatory clauses, relying on the good will of a
friendship."8 These are all ways that courts have-albeit inconsistently-enabled
friendship to matter in the law and, indeed, promoted friendship by enforcing its
special duties." 9
In another relevant case, a court in Idaho found that a plaintiffs medical
release was voidable because his doctor was a very close friend for a long period of
time, and the doctor's statements induced the plaintiff to sign as a friend." '
Notable, perhaps, in this case was that the friend-patient only sued his friend-
doctor because he knew insurance might cover the liability-a way a dispute can
arise between friends without real friendship breakdown."1 ' Again, although any
proven misstatement of fact or mutual mistake could have led the court to void
the release, friendship was a relevant factor in the court's determination of the
312sort of disclosure owed by a friend to his counterpart.
The case of Cox v. Schner 31 is especially instructive on the friend's duty to
deal fairly. There, the plaintiff commenced an action to quiet title to a property
purportedly transferred from the defendant." ' The defendant claimed that
the transfer was invalid, owing to the plaintiffs "undue influence" over the
transferor-the defendant's deceased wife-a trusted friend and advisor of the
plaintiff.315 After noting that the burden of proving fraud usually rests with
the one asserting it, the court held that the burden should shift to the one resist-
ing the claim to prove she "exhibited the uberrima fides [utmost good faith] which
removes all doubt respecting the faimess of the contract."3"6 The court made
P.2d 884, 890 (Wash. 1951) (same); Bush v. Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885, 892 (Tex. App. 1973) (friendly
ties can give rise to confidential relationships with special duties, even if the plaintiff is a sophisti-
cated businessperson).
308. See Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (Mass. 1941).
309. In Texas, "close, personal friendships" are central in a court's consideration of whether special
fiduciary-like duties apply. See Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App. 1989); Dominguez
v. Brackney Enters., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App. 1988); Garcia v. Fabela, 673 S.W.2d 933,
935 (Tex. App. 1984); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 945-46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Bush,
500 S.W.2d at 890-91; Kalb v. Norsworthy, 428 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Holland v.
Lesesne, 350 S.W.2d 859,861-62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). One Texas case makes a point of distinguishing
real friendships from mere "business friendships" that should receive no special treatment. See Thigpen
v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). Other states have also recognized friendships as
establishing a duty to deal fairly. See, e.g., Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412,417-18 (Pa. 1981) (holding
that an elderly plaintiff was entitled to a fair price from younger neighbors who befriended her).
310. See Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631, 633-34 (Idaho 1940).
311. Id. at 632-33.
312. Id. at 633-34.
313. 156 P. 509 (Cal. 1916).
314. Id. at 511.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 513.
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clear that this burden-shifting regime should apply not only to parties whose
relationships are traditionally considered to be confidential, such as physicians,
attorneys, and clergymen, but also to those parties "who by the very force of
their... relationship are presumed to be in the class of persons bound to act
with the utmost good faith." ' 7 The friends in this case were held to be included
in this class and the transfer was held invalid."'
Finally, a duty to deal fairly might be discharged through heightened puni-
tive damages for friends who wrong one another. Take the case of TVT Records
v. Island Def Jam Music Group) 9 The fact that members of the litigating parties
were friends influenced the court's determination about whether an unusually
high punitive damage award was appropriate. The jury awarded the plaintiff
approximately $132 million in compensatory and punitive damages in a dispute
involving breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations,
fraud, and willful copyright infringement. ' The defendant-a division of the
world's largest record company, Universal Music Group Recordings--objected to
the award and moved for remittitur, arguing that its conduct was not sufficiently
reprehensible to sustain the punitive damage award.32' In disposing of the defen-
dant's motion (and ultimately granting it), the court noted that social relation-
ships and friendship underlying the transaction may counsel for or against the
award and can help assess the reprehensibility of the conduct.1 12 In particular, the
court found it relevant that TVT's principal owner and chief executive officer
considered a certain high-ranking official at Universal "one of his closest friends
in the industry" and "a personal mentor and confidant.. 23  Although this
consideration was one of many factors, it highlights how friendship may, after
all, trigger special duties of fair dealing that are enforceable through punitive
damage levels. 24
317. Id.
318. Id. For another example of a friend taking advantage of a friendship-and the court
penalizing the friend as a fiduciary-see Turner v. Miller, 618 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
319. 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
320. Id. at 416.
321. Id. at 416-17.
322. Id. at 444-45.
323. Id. at 445.
324. It is probably worth noting for completeness that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
thoroughly rejected the punitive damage analysis offered by this trial court. See TVT Records v.
Island Def Jam Music Group, 412 F.3d 82, 93-96 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the appellate court did
not comment specifically on the district court's consideration of personal relationships in punitive
damage assessment.
One also might imagine that an abuse of a friendship might figure into a criminal sentence by
subjecting a defendant to an enhancement for an "abuse of a position of trust." See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (1992). For discussion of this possibility, compare
United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1190-93 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that no abuse of a position of
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Those persuaded by the arguments in Part II may want to develop fur-
ther an account of friendship's duties of disclosure and fair dealing and help
guide courts in finding friendship relevant to the inquiry of whether a plain-
tiff was owed special duties. In this issue area, there is already an inconsistent
jurisprudence that can be investigated systematically, one that could use
guidance from scholars sensitive to the importance of friendship. Obviously,
the cases are not easy to reconcile and do not operate with a definition of
friendship that can be efficiently applied in future cases. But, generally
speaking, fiduciary duties-and courts relying upon them-"arguably help
create" and maintain "extralegal norms. '
3. The Duty of Confidentiality
3 26
A potential fiduciary duty owed by friends may take the form of a confi-
dentiality requirement. This is easiest to imagine in the context of the insider
trading prohibitions interpreting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Rule lOb-5,327 adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.328
Under the "misappropriation" doctrine of insider trading liability, an investor
commits fraud "when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." '329
The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Hagan,3 ' recently made clear that
there is no duty not to trade on material nonpublic information unless one gets
trust enhancement was appropriate when a defendant took advantage of his friend in perpetrating his
fraud), with United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding an abuse of a
position of trust when a friend sexually abused his friend's daughter). The central idea is that an enhance-
ment may be appropriate because those who take advantage of friendships may be more culpable than
those who do not. See Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1191 (citing United States v. Craddock, 993 F.2d 338, 340
(3d Cir. 1993)). Yet the enhancement can just as easily incentivize people not to abuse their
friendships in their criminal activities.
325. Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 237 (citing Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1741-42, 1744 (2001)); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2425 (1995) ("By establishing a standard of performance that
emphasizes heightened obligations of loyalty and integrity, and by the use of hortatory moral rhetoric,
the law invokes a personal sense of moral obligation in the performance of fiduciary duty.").
Of course, as Ribstein warns, "The law may be ineffective if it tries to develop a norm that is too far
removed from existing perceptions of good behavior. Courts squander their moral authority by condemn-
ing conduct that people widely regard as being in the ordinary course of business." Ribstein, supra, at 237
(citing Robert Cooter, Expressive Law & Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 601-06 (1998)).
326. Bill Wang was especially helpful in developing this Subpart.
327. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Gb-5 (2006).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
329. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
330. 521 U.S. 642.
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the information through a confidential relationship."' The relationship involved
in O'Hagan was one that classically requires confidentiality and trust, and is a
traditional fiduciary relationship: lawyer-client."2 Indeed, courts have found
misappropriation liability to lie in other 'hombook' fiduciary relationship[s],
such as: ... executor-heir, guardian-ward, principal-agent, trustee-beneficiary, or
senior corporate official-shareholder. '.3
The influential Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v.
Chestman"' also guides the law in this area. There, the court held that one may
not misappropriate information in breach of a fiduciary duty "or similar relationship
of trust and confidence. 3 . Yet, it simultaneously held that a family relationship,
standing alone, is insufficient to trigger liability. 36 A natural question for the
research agenda commenced here is whether a friendship should qualify as a
relationship of trust or confidence to trigger misappropriation liability.
Yet friends would seem to lack inequality, a prerequisite for the fiduciary
or quasi-fiduciary relationship underlying misappropriation liability in Chestman.
Chestman requires qualifying relationships to be "characterized by superiority,
dominance, or control," the inequality presumed not to characterize friendship
in Part I.337 Nevertheless, the SEC has recently called certain holdings in Chestman
into doubt. For example, the SEC has written:
[T]he Chestman majority's approach does not fully recognize the degree
to which parties to close family and personal relationships have reasonable
and legitimate expectations of confidentiality in their communica-
tions. For this reason, we believe the Chestman majority view does not
sufficiently protect investors and the securities markets from the misap-
propriation and resulting misuse of inside information. s
This dissatisfaction with Chestman led to the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 10b5-2, a regulation that makes clear that family relationships of "spouse,
331. Id. at 660-66.
332. Id. at 653.
333. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also United States v.
Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cit. 2001) (finding misappropriation in an employer-employee context);
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding the same in a psychiatrist-patient
relationship). For a general discussion, see 1 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 271, § 5:4.3.
334. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
335. Id. at 566.
336. Id. at 568.
337. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. But see United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 712-18
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding a father-son relationship
without dominance or control to be sufficiently confidential to trigger misappropriation liability,
although also finding that mere kinship is not enough to trigger a duty of confidentiality).
338. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,602 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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parent, child, or sibling" will be presumed confidential unless a party can show
otherwise. 39 Friends, however, were not similarly named in the nonexclusive
list offered by the SEC.
Yet nothing should necessarily stop a court from taking notice that strong
personal relationships of friendship can be presumed to be confidential and can
be the basis of misappropriation liability under Rule 10b5-2. The SEC has
rejected Chestman-and those interested in having the law protect friendship
could urge courts to recognize friendships' duties of confidentiality in the 10b-5
insider trading context.
340
B. The Privileges of Friendship?
1. The Privilege of Informality
Friends deal with one another with some degree of informality. Friends
are not usually mere business partners and likely have enhanced levels of trust
and reliance between them. This reality and the reasonability of their reliance
may counsel for different treatment by the law.
Perhaps one could argue that friends need not require consideration for
their promises to be binding. Of course, nearly all contracts require consideration.
But there are clear exceptions for certain kinds of donative promises that trigger
reasonable reliance.3 ' Because friends can be presumed to rely on one another,
perhaps their donative promises to one another should be presumed enforceable
through the law. At the very least, it should be easy within friendships to find
donative intent in making gifts.
342
339. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2006).
340. A similar conclusion is offered by Ray J. Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal
Relationships as a Basis for Insider Trading Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 493 (2002) (concluding
that "[tihe SEC should abandon any inquiry into the quality of relationships with family members
and friends, and should simply conclude that they all involve relationships of trust and confidence"
for the purposes of misappropriation liability). But see SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (endorsing a restrictive view of the relationship of trust and confidence in the context
of a lengthy analysis of misappropriation liability).
341. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
342. For a gift to be effective, a donor must transfer property without consideration and with
donative intent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 6.1(a) (2003). Although it is usually relatively easy to ascertain the subjective intent of a
donor, many cases arise where courts must determine whether donative intent, in fact, was present.
Friendship should, perhaps, furnish a presumption that the donor intended to make a gift-as familial
relations provide, see Estate of Lang v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 404, 413 (1975) (finding a presumption of
donative intent in familial gift transactions).
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A ready example comes from the recent case of Stukas v. Muller."' Muller
was a close friend of an elderly couple, Burton and Doris Stukas; the three
began their friendship in the 1970s.' In 1995, the couple transferred money
and property (their farm and home) into Muller's name, opened a joint account
with him (from which he withdrew $20,000), and named him executor of Doris's
will.' The court found that consideration was paid for the farm,346 but that none
was paid for the Stukas residence or for the establishment of the joint account. 47
In rejecting the claim of Stukas's conservator for unjust enrichment, the court
noted that the closeness of the relationship among the parties warranted
concluding that the joint account and residence were, in fact, gifts given to a
"close friend" who was "liked" and "trusted. 348
The law of fiduciary duties is relevant in this context as well. Take the
recent New York case, Schwartz v. Houss"' There, the plaintiff and defendant
were close friends and neighbors."' The plaintiff allegedly transferred property
to his friend to hold as a nominee while the house was being converted for a
different use; the plan was for the defendant-friend to give the property back
upon completion of the work."' When the plaintiff died, the defendant informed
his friend's children that he intended to sell the property rather than return it
to the estate."' The plaintiffs children sued to impose a constructive trust
over the property and for a permanent injunction to prevent the sale.53' There
was some factual dispute over whether any consideration for the original transfer
changed hands, and whether the purported agreement was formalized in any
writing.'5 ' The core of the legal dispute was whether there was a confidential or
fiduciary relationship between the parties, as such a relationship is a requirement
for imposing a constructive trust in New York."5' The defendant opposed the
trust because he believed that no such relationship could be predicated upon
mere friendship.
343. No. 04-1230, 2005 WL 1225382 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2005).
344. Id. at * 1.
345. id.
346. Id. at *2.
347. Id. at *3.
348. Id. at *2.
349. No. 21741/04, 2005 WL 579152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2005).
350. Id. at *1.
351. id.
352. Id. at *2.
353. Id.
354. Id. at *3.
355. Id. at *4 ("It is well settled that in order to set forth a valid cause of action to impose a
constructive trust, the following four elements must be alleged: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship,
(2) a promise, express or implied, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Nevertheless, the court firmly held that such a relationship could be
found "in appropriate circumstances, between close friends. 3 56 And the court
viewed the informality of the agreement itself as proof that the close friendship
was one of trust and confidentiality: "Thus, contrary to defendant's argument,
plaintiffs have adequately alleged that [parties] were not merely social friends,
and that the absence of a formal written agreement was a consequence of the
close relationship between [the parties].3 57
The case is similar to the New York case of Cody v. Galow,35s in which a
party claimed he casually gave money to his friend, expecting the money to be
returned.3 9 When the plaintiff-friend married another woman (the plaintiff was
a man and the defendant a woman) without telling his friend, the defendant
denied ever having received the money to hold for the plaintiff.6 There was no
formal documentation or writing, and the defendant-friend opposed the plain-
tiffs application for a constructive trust over what he deemed his own property.6
The court, in imposing the trust, noted the "close, harmonious and trusting
relationship" '362 between the two "close friends" '363 (prior to their falling out over
the plaintiffs marriage), finding that the "court of equity should interpose its
powers to remedy the wrong" between friends.364 The court found a confidential
relationship existed and was not deterred by the informality of the transaction
between friends.6 '
It is, perhaps, not surprising that constructive trust actions and unjust
enrichment actions-actions expressly predicated on equity-seem more sensi-
tive to friendships and the privileges and benefits that should accrue to them.366
356. Id. (quoting Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)).
357. Id.
358. 214 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
359. Id. at 128.
360. Id. It is possible that this case involves sex and courtship, and should be excluded from
my analysis, given the discussion supra Part I.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 129 (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919)).
365. Id.
366. For another demonstrative constructive trust case where friendship served as the predicate
confidential or fiduciary relationship, see Holland v. Lesesne, 350 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961) ("[lit has been well established that such strict and technical relationships as trustee and cestui
que trust, principal and agent, attorney and client, are not indispensable, but that such informal
relationships, such as moral, social, domestic, or merely personal ones, where one person trusts in and
relies upon another, are sufficient" to establish a fiduciary or confidential relationship for purposes of
imposing a constructive trust.). There, the court found a fiduciary relationship because "an unusually
close personal friendly and confidential relationship existed between the parties and their families.
They visited each other regularly, they dined together, and they vacationed together." Id.
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Still, it is useful to expose this heightened sensitivity in the equity context to
show how friendship may be given legal effect in other domains 67 It is also
instructive to show that even though the law has no organized approach to its
regulation or promotion of friendship, regulation and friendship promotion are
not wholly anathema, and they occur in a variety of contexts. But it is happen-
ing below the radar of legal academics, lawmakers, and judges, who have not
shown especial interest in developing a systematic law of friendship or a legal
framework that recognizes the status of friendship as one worthy of attention.
2. The Privilege of Caregiving
Family members are not the only care providers when individuals get sick.
Accordingly, state and federal legislators might consider a "Friends and Medical
Leave Act" in recognition that, just as we feel it appropriate for our govern-
ments to force certain employers to give us leave to take care of family mem-
bers, 16 we should similarly be given leave from our jobs to help our friends in
need-especially friends who do not have familial resources nearby. One of the
privileges of friendship should, perhaps, be the privilege to give care, and the
law could endorse this privilege through a series of legislative initiatives.
But there are also judicial forums where the issue of caregiving to friends
has been explored. Consider In re Conservatorship of Estate of McDowell 9
There, the court held that a decedent's friend who helped care for her in her
final stages of life should not be presumed to have exerted undue influence
under California's Probate Code § 21350, disabling the friend from inheriting
under the decedent's will. 7 The code requires that all "care custodians" be pre-
sumptively disqualified from being a named beneficiary in a will unless they can
show that the will was not the result of undue influence." The court, applying
Some other academics have noticed and commented upon the role of friendship in deter-
mining whether fiduciary relationships have formed. See Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the
Campfire: Understanding Confidential Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315, 344-52 (2000); Gregory B.
Westfall, Comment, But I Know It When I See It: A Practical Framework for Analysis and Argument of
Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835 (1992).
367. Another example where friendship was useful to a court in an equitable determination is
Hedges v. Primavera, 218 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1963). There, a "close and intimate" friendship was
deemed to "explain[ I and excuse[ I plaintiffs failure sooner to discover defendant's fraud and deceit,"
enabling the court to find that the statute of limitations on the fraud and deceit action was equitably
tolled. Id. at 801-02.
368. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
369. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
370. Id. at 677. This case actually provides an interesting contrast with Cox, which I
explored supra text accompanying notes 313-317.
371. The definition of "care custodian" is administratively defined in the California Welfare
and Institutions Code as any "administrator or ... employee of [a variety ofl public or private facilities
Friendship & the Law
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In re Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, ' found that the statute was
intended to limit professional caregivers' ability to receive donative transfers
from their elderly patients, but was not meant to limit an elderly person's ability
to "recognize and reward services performed for them... by close personal
friends, intimates, and companions. 37 3 Friends, Davidson held, should be allowed
to help one another in old age without the presumption against being a
beneficiary attaching, recognizing an inchoate privilege for friends to provide
care (without discrimination in testamentary dispositions).374 In McDowell,
the court found the decedent's friend to be "well meaning," even though the
friendship was of relatively short duration.375
However, more recent case law in California has called McDowell into
question, and has held that close personal friends who provide care do come
within the statute and are presumptively disqualified from being donees.
Bernard v. Foley376 now makes clear that the Probate Code's statutory scheme
does not allow for a "preexisting friendships exception" to the "care custodian"
provision-the standard articulated in Davidson and applied in McDowell. 77
The Bernard court's exercise of statutory interpretation-utilizing textual
canons, legislative history, and public policy arguments-was, at the least,
respectable.378 Yet, it was arguably insensitive to the role the law can play in
supporting friendship and the way statutory construction can incentivize the
behavior of friends. The thoughtful concurrence of Chief Justice George was
more attuned to the importance of the law's role in respecting genuine friend-
ship: In agreeing with the majority's construction of the Probate Code in the
particular case before the court, he called for legislative modification to help
support and promote friends' roles in the provision of care and aimed to limit
or agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or dependent adults, including members of
the support staff and maintenance staff' or any "protective, public, sectarian, mental health, or
private assistance or advocacy agency or person providing health services or social services to elders
or dependent adults." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (West 2001).
372. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
373. Id. at 713.
374. Id. at 716.
375. McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 21-25. Here is an interesting example of a court interposing
itself in a friendship and issuing judgment on the quality of the relationship.
376. 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248 (2006).
377. The resolution of this matter also implicates the discussion about donative transfers and
the friend's potential privilege of informality, discussed supra Part III.B.1. For a recent analysis of
California's "care custodian" provision, see generally Kirsten M. Kwasneski, Comment, The Danger
of a Label: How the Legal Interpretation of "Care Custodian" Can Frustrate a Testator's Wish To Make
a Gift to [a] Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 269 (2006).
378. It is worth noting that the vote split 4-3, with one member of the majority bloc writing sepa-
rately to explain his position more carefully. Bernard, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65 (George, C.J., concurring).
54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 631 (2007)698
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 698 2006-2007
the holding of Bernard to its facts)79 If the normative argument in Part II was
convincing, Chief Justice George's approach may be the preferred one, and
state legislatures would be well advised to carve "preexisting friendship" excep-
tions to statutes like the one at issue in Bernard.1
80
3. The Privilege of Privacy
The relationship of trust and confidence that is friendship (in life if not
always in law) also could be granted a different range of privacies than it has
under current law. This issue was recognized over twenty years ago by Sanford
Levinson;"5 ' he attempted to find a way to give the status of friend the same
respect that evidence law confers upon certain relationships with members of
the family, the bar, and the cloth."82 Our relationships with our spouses (and our
children and parents in some jurisdictions), our lawyers, and our rabbis and
priests are protected from discovery in public proceedings, but our communica-
tions with our best friends have no such protection. Levinson's particular pro-
posal-allowing people to issue a finite number of "privilege" tickets to
whomever they want, including friends and family tS3-has gained little traction
and no adherents. 4 Yet Levinson highlighted an interesting problem, whose
solution may lie in further consideration of how the law could protect a friend-
ship's privilege of privacy. If the law developed a recognizable category of friend,
perhaps we would not need to distribute tickets to figure out who is entitled to
the privilege of privacy.
The Monica Lewinsky affair may be the most recent highly publicized
example where intimacies between friends were required to be exposed to the
379. Id.
380. Of course, if the law ultimately treats friendship as triggering a full panoply of fiduciary
duties, courts may also have to presume undue influence in situations like this one. This highlights
that one needs to be careful before embracing the "friend-as-fiduciary" idea: We may not want friends
to be fiduciaries for all purposes.
381. Levinson, supra note 7.
382. The Beyond Conjugality report also embraces this approach to respecting friendship.
BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 34, at 46.
383. Levinson, supra note 7, at 654-62.
384. Sanford Levinson, Structuring Intimacy: Some Reflections on the Fact that the Law Generally
Does Not Protect Us Against Unwanted Gazes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2073, 2079 (2001) ("To put it mildly, the
proposal has gathered no support .... ). One notable exception to the silence with which Levinson's
article was met may be Judge Levy, in dissent in Diehl v. State, 698 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex. App. 1985)
(Levy, J., dissenting). In disagreeing with the majority's ruling in Diehl that there was no parent-child
privilege in Texas, judge Levy felt that "it is necessary to face the relationship issue squarely in order to
reach a just and salutary result... because the most serious, intimate, and tar-reaching social values are
in conflict here, involving the very nature of the relationships between the individual, the family,
and the State." Id. at 717.
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state: Kenneth Starr got Monica Lewinsky's best friend, Catherine Aliday
Davis, to testify and share intimate emails with his grand jury. 8 Surely this
goes on all the time. Friends are pitted against friends, threatened with indict-
ment for failure to cooperate-and no testimonial privilege can protect them as
it protects spouses."'
Should the law of evidence allow us to claim a friendship privilege? That
is a question I cannot answer here, for that is a project for the second-generation
portion of this research enterprise. At the very least, however, if courts or legisla-
tors were to begin to recognize a friendship privilege, the descriptive effort in
Part I might guide a relevant multifactor test to figure out which friends qualify.
There is another general area within the law where a friendship's "right to
privacy" might also be vindicated: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 7 If the
law were truly interested in protecting our friendships, we might have different
Fourth Amendment rights than we do under current doctrine.
It is undoubtedly the case that "police conduct in searching may have an
impact on [a defendant's] ... friends." '388 Indeed, police searches routinely disrupt
shared spaces where friendship occurs in privacy. For example, friends often
spend time together in one another's home or car. Yet police searches need not
currently respect "shared" privacy and are only bound to respect the privacy of an
individual. As Mary Coombs explains, "Most lay people... are probably not
aware that the law would not recognize their claim to privacy in a friend's car.1389
Accordingly, it may make sense to create a category of friendship privacy within
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Here is Coombs's provocative suggestion:
[Clourts should recognize that a gratuitous bailment gives rise to expec-
tations of shared privacy even though the bailee has only a minimal legal
claim against the bailor. For example, I might, when leaving town for a few
days, ask my closest friend to keep my expensive new painting for me.
When she agrees, I can assume that she will place it in some place to
which she has access and which she feels is safe from strangers. If the police
break into her house a few days later and find the painting in her closet, I
385. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 54 (2000).
386. See Levinson, supra note 384, at 2074 (Monica Lewinsky's best friend's "status as 'best
friend' prevented neither the subpoena nor her cooperation with the grand jury; her cooperation was
bought, apparently, by an immunity agreement that protected her against potential prosecution for
attempting to erase the relevant e-mails.").
387. For a much more elaborate and sophisticated analysis of this issue, see Mary I. Coombs,
Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987).
388. Id. at 1594.
389. Id. at 1596.
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ought to be able to assert a [F]ourth [A]mendment challenge to the search.
Current doctrine does not bar the recognition of such shared privacy claims.
However, because such concerns are not explicitly recognized by current
[Flourth [A]mendment law, the courts neglect them.'90
If the privilege of privacy within a friendship is disrupted by a police search,
perhaps a legal regime interested in protecting friendships would give the friend
the legal right to challenge a search. To some extent, a version of this right exists
on account of Jones v. United States,39' where the Supreme Court recognized a
claimant's right to contest a search of his good friend's house because he was
staying there, had permission to do so, and was, in any case, the defendant
charged with possession." 2 Yet, Jones did not consider the possibility for a privacy
privilege conferred by friendship and, in any event, has been subject to
substantial criticism."' Perhaps all that can be said on behalf of those who wish
to establish more Fourth Amendment protection for friends is that litigants
should push courts to recognize that friends routinely have a shared expectation
of privacy between them that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should grow
to appreciate more substantially)94
If we care to protect friendships from abuse, perhaps the normative argument
in Part II has something to recommend on the Fourth Amendment issue of "false
friends." '95  False friends are government agents who extract information from
defendants by pretending to be their friends. And as James Tomkovicz has written,
"[F]ourth [A]mendment challenges to this law enforcement method, in all its
forms, have inevitably fallen upon a majority of deaf ears." '396 The logic for the
failures of these challenges turns on the idea that victims of the false friends
disclose voluntarily any secret information and have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in such disclosures. If friends are entitled to the privilege of privacy
390. Id. at 1618-19 (citation omitted).
391. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
392. Id. at 265-67.
393. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Rakas did not allow the rationale of Jones to
extend to any right of privacy associated with riding in a friend's car. Id. at 140-49. AndJones's "automatic
standing" rule (for the defendant) was overruled in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).
394. See Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1983) ("[A person] who entrusts property to a relative, friend or confederate in crime ordinarily
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in any private place where the bailee stores this property.").
395. See generally id. at 33; Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the
Meaning of "Searches" in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 344 (1984);
James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth
Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 727-30 (1985).
396. Tomkovicz, supra note 395, at 727 n.331 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971); Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)).
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(and the related duty of confidentiality explored above),397 perhaps the false-friend
problem cries for a different solution in a polity properly attuned to the needs
of friendships.
The entrapment defense could similarly be made sensitive to the friend's
privilege of privacy. In Sherman v. United States,398 Joseph Sherman claimed that
the government's informant abused the friendship between them, inducing him
to commit a crime he likely would not have otherwise committed if he had not
been so concerned for his friend's well-being. 99 Sherman met the informant at a
doctor's office where they were both being treated for drug addiction; they
quickly bonded, owing to their similar struggles to overcome the addiction.4"
Ultimately, the informant tried to get Sherman to obtain drugs for him, which
Sherman did (after refusing several requests)."' He did so without profit 42 and
was subsequently arrested.4 3
A jury rejected Sherman's entrapment defense, finding that Sherman was
"predisposed to commit the act and exhibited only the natural hesitancy of one
acquainted with the narcotics trade." The Court reversed the jury, finding that
397. The "secrets" view of friendship discussed in Cocking & Kennett, supra note 45, might be
especially relevant in developing this area.
398. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
399. Id. at 371-72.
400. Id. at 371.
401. Id.
402. Id. This actually raises another interesting intersection of the law and friendship: whether
doing a favor for a friend is a type of profit that accrues to the gift giver. The inquiry is especially
relevant in the context of "tipper liability" for those who improperly tip their friends and colleagues
by conveying material nonpublic information. For Rule lOb-5 liability to lie against a tipper under
the "classic relationship" theory, a "personal benefit" must pass to the tipper on account of the tip.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666-67 (1983); 1 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 271, § 5:2.8.
Courts have held that a tipper passes the personal-benefit test when the benefit is merely vicarious
and the tipper feels good because the tippee feels good; these courts contemplate that a seemingly gratuitous
tip to a friend can nevertheless constitute a substantive personal benefit. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 ("The
elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a
gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend."); 1 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note
271, § 5:2.8[C] (citing SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1998), and SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623,
633 (7th Cit. 1995), as examples where the personal-benefit test was met between friends).
Perhaps we need to debate more carefully whether tips between friends are part of an exchange in
which a real personal benefit accrues to the friend offering the tip, or whether we ought to view tips
by certain friends as fully gratuitous, to which no presumption of personal benefit should apply. The
law, at least in SEC v. Downe, 969 F. Supp. 149, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), seems to take the "exchange
theory" to be appropriate, consistent with the views about friendship and mutual assistance supra Part
I.B. (For sources on "exchange theory," see supra note 59.) But it may be that we do not want our law
to endorse this exchange-theorist or "use" (from Aristotle's typology) conception of friendship. We
might also want the law to recognize that there are some friendships where gifts are, in fact, given purely
gratuitously. More thinking about this matter is surely warranted.
403. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371.
404. Id. at 371.
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 702 2006-2007
Friendship & the Law 703
the entrapment defense was established as a matter of law: The informant's
"resort to sympathy""9 was exactly the "evil which the defense of entrapment is
designed to overcome."' Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the reversal of the
jury's decision, was particularly disdainful of the government's appeal to friend-
ship in ensnaring the defendant, and argued that Sherman's entrapment defense
should have been predicated upon the informant's appeal to friendship rather
than Sherman's supposed lack of criminal predisposition.4 7
Testimonial privileges, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and the entrap-
ment defense are all legal domains where more sensitivity to friendship could be
usefully developed to protect a friendship's privilege of privacy. Of course, a
regime of complete "non-recognition of the friend" ' might give friends more
privacy in a sense, but the form and range of privacy protections enumerated
here would arguably pay friendship more respect.
4. The Privilege of Vindicating Rights
Finally, there may be an argument for conferring upon friends the privilege
of third-party standing in our federal legal system. Although no federal court
fully recognizes such a form of standing, it may be yet another way to have the
legal system give the status of friend more visibility and respect in the law.
405. Id. at 373.
406. Id. at 376.
407. Id. at 383-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter's sensibility was also
given expression in Pascu v. Alaska, 577 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1978). There, Gordon Pascu raised
the defense of entrapment because his friend of five years, a government informant, induced him
to buy drugs to alleviate his pain. Id. at 1067. The informant repeatedly reminded Pascu of their
long-standing friendship. Id. The court was thoroughly disgusted with this abuse of friendship
and the informant's appeals to Pascu's "sense of obligation and sympathy," and found for Pascu.
Id. at 1068.
There is, of course, another valence to these entrapment cases, one that dovetails with the
privilege of giving care explored earlier. Perhaps these defendants deserve special consideration
not because someone else "abused" friendship but because friendship is evidence of mitigated
culpability. Helping out our friends, perhaps, earns us goodwill within the criminal law. A bill
recently introduced in the U.S. Senate is illustrative: The bill offers sentencing reductions for
minor participants in drug conspiracies if they "acted on impulse, fear, friendship, or affection."
Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2006, S. 3725, 109th Cong. § 202(2)(B) (2006), available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/files/senate-cocaine-bill.pdf.
Notably, the proposed bill also furnishes an enhancement for friendship abuse, when a drug
conspirator uses "impulse, fear, friendship, affection, or some combination thereof' to ensnare others
into a conspiracy. Id. § 201(2)(A)(ii). This indicates that abuse of friendship and being motivated
by friendship are seen by Congress as culpability factors. For more on friendship and sentencing, see
supra note 324.
Thanks to Carissa Byrne Hessick for very smart interventions on this subject.
408. Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, supra note 18, at 203.
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It is, of course, a truism of standing doctrine that people must seek to
vindicate their own rights and must sue only upon their own injuries. The
constitutional prerequisites to standing that are deemed to flow from Article III's
purported "case or controversy" requirement are "injury, causation, and
redressability.' ' °  But there is also a "prudential" limitation that the Court has
imposed: the prohibition against third-party standing, sometimes termed the rule
against jus tertii."0 The central ideas in this prudential doctrine are (1) that third
parties are not well situated to protect vigorously the interests of the "true" parties
to a dispute; (2) that the justice system will work more efficiently if it limits third-
party standing; and (3) that third parties may seek to vindicate a right that the
real party-in-interest wishes to forego."
Still, the Court has carved out a set of exceptions to the rule against jus
tertii. Two of these exceptions could, perhaps, become the basis of a true
third-party "friend" standing. '12 The first exception is that when there are sub-
stantial obstacles preventing a party from asserting her rights, a third party-if
the third party can prove that she will adequately represent all the interests of
the original party-may overcome the presumption against third-party
standing."3 One way to respect friends may be to fit them into this exception,
conferring upon them a presumption that they will adequately represent their
friends' interests.
The second exception is similarly susceptible to recognizing friends'
privilege of vindicating their counterparts' rights. This exception "permits an
individual to assert the rights of third parties where there is a close relationship
between the advocate and the third party."4 '4 This category has been applied to
allow third-party standing for doctors to represent the interests of their
patients,"' for lawyers to be named parties on behalf of their clients,"6 for
409. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 83-84 (3d ed. 1999).
410. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 187-95 (4th ed. 1996). The classic cases are United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 151 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551-57 (1996), and Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975). Some academic commentary on the subject can be found in
Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984).
411. These considerations are evident in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978), and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-15 (1976).
412. Recall the material on next friend standing, supra note 3.
413. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 409, at 84 (furnishing examples and citations).
414. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
415. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117-18 (doctor); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973)
(same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1965) (same). But see Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (declining to allow a doctor to assert the constitutional rights of his patients,
at least in part because the doctor did not assert any injury of his own).
416. See U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1990); Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1989).
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political organizations to represent the interests of their membership,4' 7 and
411for vendors to sue on behalf of their customers.
To be sure, the Court refused to allow third-party standing in the context of
a mother trying to gain standing to challenge the death penalty exacted upon
her son in the famous Gary Gilmore case.4 9  And it has been suggested that
perhaps the cases where the jus teri exceptions apply can "be explained as
involving the assertion of the plaintiffs own right to engage in ... constitutionally
protected relationship[s]. ' 142' But it may, nevertheless, be possible to develop a
jurisprudence that would allow friends to vindicate the rights of their counterparts.
And since the rule against third-party standing is prudential rather than a finn
constitutional limitation on standing, perhaps Congress could confer standing
upon friends (as long as those friends also meet the constitutional standing
requirements). Finally, obviously state courts and legislatures do not labor under
Article III constraints.
CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the status of friend does make a difference to the
law in a number of previously unnoticed ways. Ira Ellman recently argued that
"[w]e do not.., have a law of close friends."42 ' That's not quite right, after all.
Although conventional wisdom suggests that the friend does not matter at all
to the law and that friendship carries no legally enforceable duties or privileges,
doctrinal evidence does not bear out that supposition. These moments where
friendship is relevant to the administration of law are not substantial, consis-
tent, or systematic; yet, they are pervasive enough to conclude that the law
does not wholly stay out of our friendships. Thus, those who insist on the law's
nonrecognition of the friend (either for the law's sake or for friendship's sake)
must acknowledge that our current legal regime does occasionally take notice
of friendships and, indeed, regulates them.
To be sure, this Article just as surely shows that the law has no self-
conscious, consistent, or well-considered approach to friendships and its role in
regulating them. The law neither seeks to support friendships nor leaves friend-
ships fully alone. There is something haphazard about the law's approach to
417. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
418. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-97 (1976). But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961) (declining to allow shop employees to assert an Establishment Clause
claim on behalf of customers who may have been constitutionally harmed through "Blue Laws").
419. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1012-13 (1976). This case may be aberrational, if only
because Gary Gilmore himself made it clear that he did not wish to assert his own rights. Id. at 1014-15.
420. RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., supra note 410, at 153.
421. Ellman, supra note 267, at 700.
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friendship that invites further study by lawyers, lawmakers, judges, and schol-
ars. 422 At the very least, Part III begs further exploration of the ways law makes
friendship matter, why it makes friendship matter in the ways it does, and
whether there are particular areas within the law that are especially appropri-
ate (or inappropriate) for the promotion of friendship. Indeed, it may very
well be that friendship-burdening duties would ultimately undermine friend-
ships, and only friendship-strengthening privileges are properly tailored to
help promote friendship.423 But this Article leaves this kind of analysis for
second-generation stabs at the subject matter.424
422. It may be haphazard because when presented with disputes involving friendships, courts
simply try to "be fair" rather than try "to set incentives for socially desirable intimate behavior." Id. at
707. That may be more or less appropriate because, as Ellman argues, "the law is a minor actor among
all the factors that influence people in their intimate behavior." Id. at 702. Ultimately, I tend to think
Ellman underestimates the law's influence and, in any case, I remain convinced that gaining some
systematicity about friendship will prove more sound than general attempts to figure out how to "be
fair" without guidance about what the status of the friend is and why it is important. Our very sense
of equity and fairness emerges from our commitments to the status in the first place; accordingly, I do
not think we can avoid the task of attempting to achieve some understanding of the status itself-and
its importance.
423. Friendship-burdening duties like the duties of rescue, disclosure, and fair dealing might
lead people to issue friendship disclaimers: "I like you alright, Ethan, but I do not want to be your
friend for legal purposes." Perhaps these duties would lead to fewer friendships rather than more
general friendship promotion. I am not sure, however, that that would necessarily be a bad result. If
people were more honest about how they felt about one another and how close they felt toward their
group of acquaintances, people would likely be saved a lot of personal pain.
It is not obvious, in any case, whether such a proclamation should be sufficient to overcome the
potential duties of friendship developed here. Perhaps friends should be judged by what they do
rather than by what they say. See Anderson, supra note 366, at 327-30 (arguing that courts tend
to prefer objective evidence and discount subjective evidence in establishing the fiduciary nature of a
relationship); id. at 330 ("A contract provision denying the existence of a confidential
relationship ... when in fact such a relationship did exist, should always be invalid and unen-
forceable. It would, in effect, represent a disclaimer of fiduciary liability which, under the familiar
rule everywhere, is void as against public policy."); Westfall, supra note 366, at 857 n.142
(highlighting that close friendships are relatively easy to prove with objective evidence and citing
cases where Texas courts utilized objective evidence to establish that parties were, in fact, close
friends). For the larger debate about whether one should be "contractarian" about fiduciary duties,
see, for example, Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & EcON. 425 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of
Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990). Indeed, it may be that
"contract thinking" is a "poor model for intimate relations. Old fashion status rules updated as
needed to shed gender role rigidities, are far better." Ira Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was
Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1367 (2001).
424. An excellent place to begin that project might be Zechariah Chafee's observations about
appropriate policy considerations for which policymakers should account when they are deciding
whether to intervene in relationships. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations
Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1021-29 (1930).
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It should be fairly obvious from the doctrinal explorations offered in Part III
of how certain courts have let (or not let) friendship matter that judges and leg-
islators have spent little time thinking about who should qualify for the status of
friend when friendship is deemed relevant. Accordingly, any of the more aspira-
tional or purely speculative ways the law could serve friends that Part III
identifies have little guidance from current cases about how to designate friends.
How, for example, could a court or legislature identify who should count as a
friend sufficient to allow him or her to vindicate the rights of a party through
third-party standing? None of the little jurisprudence there is on friendship within
the law furnishes a workable definition of the category. Indeed, as Coombs has
suggested, "It is difficult.., to define the boundaries of a 'friendship' category in
administrable terms. 425 We are back to the very first question with which we
began. And we must be careful only to exact special duties and confer special
privileges upon those who are friends in a meaningful sense or whose conduct
implicates the very institution of friendship. Without such parameters, we may
fall prey to what Roberto Unger once called "a stifling despotism of virtue.426
This is exactly where Part I should prove especially useful. If the argu-
ments of Part II were persuasive, there is good reason to expand the ways the
law recognizes, promotes, and facilitates friendship. But the law can only do so
if it has a workable concept that it is aiming to promote. This Article will serve
as a starting point for further efforts to get the law to have a more sophisticated
approach to the regulation-and, preferably, the promotion-of friendship.
425. Coombs, supra note 387, at 1654.
426. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561,
641 (1983).
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